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Abstract
We present a sharp test for the efficiency of job separations. First, we document a dramatic increase
in the separation rate – 11.2ppt (28%) over five years – in response to a quasi-experimental extension
of UI benefit duration for older workers. Second, after the abolition of the policy, the “job survivors”
in the formerly treated group exhibit exactly the same separation behavior as the control group.
Juxtaposed, these facts reject the “Coasean” prediction of efficient separations, whereby the UI
extensions should have extracted marginal (low-surplus) jobs and thereby rendered the remaining
(high-surplus) jobs more resilient after its abolition. Third, we show that a formal model of predicted
efficient separations implies a piece-wise linear function of the actual control group separations
beyond the missing mass of marginal matches. A structural estimation reveals point estimates of
the share of efficient separations below 4%, with confidence intervals rejecting shares above 13%.
Fourth, to characterize the marginal jobs in the data, we extend complier analysis to difference-in-
difference settings such as ours. The UI-indiced separators stemmed from declining firms, blue-collar
jobs, with a high share of sick older workers, and firms more likely to have works councils – while
their wages were similar to program survivors. The evidence is consistent with a “non-Coasean”
framework building on wage frictions preventing efficient bargaining, and with formal or informal
institutional constraints on selective separations.
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1 Introduction
By Coasean theories of jobs, the employer and the worker exploit all bilateral gains from trade.1
Hence all job separations are mutually preferable and efficient, in contrast to the inefficient separations
predicted by frictional (“non-Coasean”) theories that put limits on contracting due to, e.g., wage
rigidity or institutional constraints. While the Coasean benchmark provides a powerful and popular
point of departure in theoretical models, the degree to which they provide accurate descriptions of
real-world job formation and destruction remains an open question. An empirical test of the Coasean
benchmark is challenging exactly because of the abstract allocative concepts underlying its strong
efficiency implications in the first place: joint job surplus split by unrestricted transferable-utility
compensation arrangements. For example, measured flow wages, even if appearing perfectly rigid, can
be interpreted to be consistent with bilaterally efficient bargaining outcomes (Barro, 1977; Hall, 2005;
Shimer, 2004; Hall and Milgrom, 2008), and categories such as quits and layoffs can be interpreted
as mere nominal labels of efficient separations in the Coasean framework (McLaughlin, 1991). As a
result, the Coasean hypothesis and its tractable implementation through efficient bargaining remains
the benchmark model, for example, in search and matching models (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994;
Pissarides, 2000), even in the face of pervasive evidence for the dramatic costs from job displacement
(see, e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993; Davis and von Wachter, 2011).
We provide a sharp and high-powered test of whether Coasean theories can account for job sepa-
rations in a uniquely suited quasi-experiment: a large, temporary unemployment insurance extension
of potential benefit duration from one to four years in Austria from 1988 through 1993, the Regional
Extended Benefit Program (REBP). Our analysis uses population matched employer-employee data
and implements a clean difference-in-differences design, since eligibility was determined by age cutoffs
(age 50 and up) and was restricted to specific regions.
Our first empirical step documents that the program triggered an increase in separations of 11.2ppt
(28%) over the five-year horizon the program was active: 50% of jobs in treatment group separated,
compared to only 39% in the treatment group. We illustrate this finding by plotting raw data for the
fivbe-year job separation rate by birth cohorts in the treatment and control regions. Cohorts too old
or too young to be eligible move in lockstep, while the treated cohorts exhibit a clear increase in job
separations. These UI-induced separations largely go into long-term unemployment, consistent with
reductions in surplus arising from the workers’ improved nonemployment outside option. We therefore
also provide new nonparametric causal evidence that UI incentives can induce separations and generate
large unemployment inflows, at least in our context of older workers with the ability to use program
as a bridge into early retirement.2
1We use “Coasean” as a short-hand to describe settings in which bilateral bargaining is unconstrained and parties can
and hence will reach bilaterally efficient outcomes, including at the separation margin. For example, just as the initial
assignment of property rates is irrelevant by the Coase Theorem, the initial incidence of a worker or firm shock will be
irrelevant in our setting. Importantly, our notion of efficiency is bilateral and at the separation margin, and hence does
not fully characterize market efficiency, such as those that would emerge at the hiring margin (Hosios, 1990).
2We have found similar separation rate increases studying quarterly transition probabilities rather than five-year
horizons. Winter-Ebmer (2003) studies inflow effects from REBP, between two broad groups (all below 50 vs. 50-65)
using a 2% sample of our population data. Lalive et al. (2011) find small inflow effects of different, national reform in
Austria, in a regression-based difference-in-difference model. Lalive et al. (2015) study the REBP program with a focus on
search externalities from treated onto untreated unemployed job seekers’ job finding rates. Hutchens (1999) discusses the
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In a second step, we track the job survivors in both the treatment and controls groups after the
program was abruptly abolished in 1993. We again plot raw data of separations by cohort, now
among the survivors. The formerly treated cohorts – whose ranks are, on average, 20% smaller than
their control peers – were just as likely to separate year by year as the peer control cohorts. This
result holds for unconditional separations, and even in response to negative labor demand shocks
(sharp establishment shrinkage events and negative industry growth). In short, despite the massive
separations among the ranks of the formerly treated groups, the survivors do not appear more resilient
to subsequent shocks after the program was abolished.
Juxtaposed, the first result – large separations due to a well-identified transitory surplus shock –
and the second result – no subsequent resilience – are inconsistent with the Coasean benchmark. By the
Coasean hypothesis, the firm and worker exploit all gains from trade and hence the allocative surplus
is a one-dimensional concept of joint surplus, the sum of the worker’s and firm’s inside value of the job
(e.g., productivity, amenities) minus the sum of the outside options (e.g., hiring an alternative worker,
quitting into unemployment). In the Coasean setting, the extraction of low-surplus jobs should have
generated a missing mass of marginal matches with low joint job surplus. Any source of subsequent
(post-abolition) surplus drop should have swept up fewer jobs into separation among the selected
survivors of the UI program.3 By contrast, frictional, i.e. non-Coasean, theories detach worker and
firm surplus, and permit an absence of resilience even after a high share of jobs have been destroyed
by a temporary surplus reduction.
Third, to quantitatively assess the gap between predicted Coasean separations and the data, we
construct and structurally estimate a model-derived benchmark of efficient job separations, and then
ask which share of REBP separations was consistent with this benchmark. Intuitively, the model
exploits separation rate differentials among job survivors between the treatment and control group after
the program had been abolished, to retroactively classify the efficiency of the initial REBP separations.
We translate the Coasean surplus-based “pecking order” into an empirically tractable piece-wise linear
function of predicted post-REBP Coasean separations in the formerly treated group compared to
actual separations in the former control group: zero up until a “kink” corresponding to the treatment
effect of the initial program on separations, and a tight comovement thereafter. Due to the UI-
induced separations, kink is far on the x-axis, and so the Coasean benchmark predicts substantial
“resilience” among REBP survivors. We estimate this model structurally, using GMM estimation
to select the weight on the Coasean prediction, using variation between industry-occupation cells in
control separation rates and kink locations. Even in our most conservative specification, the point
estimates for the share of Coasean separations are smaller than 4%, with the 95% confidence interval
at 13%.
All efficient separations are alike; each frictional setting is inefficient in its own way, as with Tolstoy’s
theoretical interaction of UI and retirement. Inderbitzin et al. (2016) study the interaction of UI and disability insurance
system in Austria. Kyyra¨ and Wilke (2007) provide empirical evidence for that interaction in Finland. Hartung et al.
(2018) study the macroeconomic consequences of a German labor market reform for job separations. Feldstein (1976)
studies temporary layoffs and recalls, whereas we study permanent nonemployment. These studies focus on inflow vs.
outflow effects of UI, and do not study the quality of marginal jobs, or the compositional consequences after the abolition.
3We also discuss, but ultimately quantitatively dismiss, a third interpretation that in principle could be at play:
idiosyncratic shocks could immediately and completely “reshuﬄe” the surplus distribution and thereby mask the Coasean
nature of separations.
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unhappy families. While a menu of frictions may explain the documented stark deviation from the
Coasean benchmark, we sketch a particularly plausible class of non-Coasean narratives building on
wage setting frictions. By preventing the flexible (re-)bargaining underlying the Coasean result, such
frictions shrink the set of viable jobs by complicating the “positive surplus” test from single-dimensional
Coasean joint job surplus, to two surplus concepts: separations may occur because either worker-specific
or firm-specific surplus turns negative. In this world, the original UI extension would have destroyed
matches with low worker surplus. Indeed, we use a retrospective worker survey to document that a
significant share of the original separations in response to the reform materialized as voluntary to the
worker (quits). The fact that despite the dramatic depletion of their ranks the treated cohorts move
in lock-step with the control cohorts, implies that after the reform, firm surplus is largely allocative
for separations, and that post-abolition separations are driven by firms crossing their participation
constraint. In the Coasean benchmark, this distinction of two unilateral surplus concepts would have
been meaningless and summed into joint surplus, forging an iron link between the marginal job in
terms of worker surplus and in terms of joint job surplus.
We also resolve an ostensible tension: why did the extraction of so many low worker -surplus jobs
in response to the initial UI program not measurably lower separation rates of the survivors? Our
resolution has two simple features. The first feature is high typical worker surplus, such that few
workers are usually on the separation margin. Indeed, our sample consists of male, older, and high-
tenured workers. Austria mandates multiple months of severance payments in the case of layoffs that
are foregone for quitters, providing little incentive for workers to quit unilaterally and pushing up
worker surplus under normal conditions.4 The second feature is the exceptional size of the initial UI
treatment – four years of full UI eligibility, potentially serving as a bridge into early retirement – likely
played a role. We ballpark the cash value of the reform to workers to be around 71% of an annual salary.
The initial outside option boost was therefore sufficiently large to sweep up even those workers that
would otherwise remain inframarginal to the typical worker-side shocks, due to high worker surplus.5
As a result, the absence of these matches had no noticable differential effect on separations after REBP.
For our sample of older workers, that exact implied joint distribution of high worker surplus and
low firm surplus, turns out to be predicted by the long-standing hypotheses of implicit contract models,
in form of backloading of compensation over the job spell (Lazear, 1979, 1981): in a period-by-period
consideration, young (low-tenure) workers are “underpaid”, while older (high-tenure) workers are “over-
paid”.6 In fact, the Austrian institutional setting features an explicit role for works councils that are
consulted in the separation process, providing formal support for such implicit contracts. Consis-
4In this world, baseline quits likely reflect large inframarginal shifts such as health shocks. See Manoli and Weber
(2016), who provide evidence that workers can delay voluntary quits until reaching the minimum-tenure threshold for
eligibility to high severance payments in Austria.
5A prediction of this view is that smaller shifts in outside options should not induce workers to separate. Indeed, in
Ja¨ger et al. (2018) we find that smaller and shorter-lived shifts in the benefit level did not entail separation effects even
among older workers and even during the 1980s in Austria.
6Frimmel et al. (2018) shed light on the Lazear hypothesis in the Austrian context. Their evidence suggests that firms
with steeper seniority-wage profiles have a higher incentive to renege on implicit contracts in the presence of exogenous
shocks. Another class of models that rationalizes the joint distribution is a model of job ladders and negotiation capital
by Cahuc et al. (2006), where workers use outside offers to ratchet up their wage and grasp surplus, with experience,
tenure and age correlating with high worker surplus and small firm surplus. However, these models feature bilaterally
efficient bargaining and separations, and hence cannot explain our full set of explanations that are inconsistent with the
Coasean view.
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tent with our surplus shifter having improved the nonemployment outside option, the REBP-induced
separations went into permanent nonemployment, evidently by workers unlikely to find or seek reem-
ployment. Our explanatory framework relies on limited correlation between the two surplus concepts,
as would emerge under some degree of wage rigidity and cross-sectional wage compression.7
In a fourth and last step, the paper provides a methodological contribution, as we extend the
complier analysis method (Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Abadie, 2003) to difference-in-differences settings
such as ours, in order to characterize the pre-separation attributes of the REBP separators. The
complier analysis reveals that REBP separators have low worker fixed effects and overwhelmingly
come from manual, blue-collar jobs (80%), while a smaller fraction (53%) of survivors stems from that
segment of the labor market. Moreover, a majority of dissolved matches stem from shrinking firms.
Lastly, REBP separators exhibited lower predicted employability (in form of predicted duration of
unemployment) and worked in industries with high rates of sickness and disability among older workers.
Overall, for these types of jobs, firms and workers such implicit contracts or the formal constraints
imposed by works councils (which are explicitly permitted to veto such layoffs due to “social hardship”
clauses) may perhaps be particularly relevant, consistent with our non-Coasean narrative.
Section 2 presents an overview of the Austrian institutional context, the reform, and our data. In
Section 3, we document the large separation effects entailed by the UI extension. In Section 4, we
study the separation behavior of the treatment and control groups after the program was abolished.
Section 5 presents a model that we estimate to formally infer the share of Coasean separations, and
present a potential specific non-Coasean setting rationalizing our findings. To trace that narrative in
the data, we use survey evidence and complier analysis to characterize the REBP separators in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Context, and Data
We review the UI system, the REBP reform, other relevant institutional context as well as our data
below.
The Austrian UI System During the 1980s and 1990s Two crucial institutional features ensure
that UI generosity cleanly shifts the nonemployment outside option of workers in our setting. First,
Austrian workers are fully eligible for UI benefits upon quitting, after fulfilling a four-week waiting
period. Second, similar to most other European countries, the Austrian system does not feature
experience rating, as the Austrian UI system is funded through employer and employee payroll taxes
(which were not affected by the reform).
During the 1980s and 1990s, the gross replacement rate was between 40% and 48% for most
employees and capped below and above at a minimum and maximum amount.8 The potential benefit
duration (PBD) of UI benefits during the 1980s was 30 weeks, provided the worker had worked (and
7In Ja¨ger et al. (2018) we have documented that Austrian wages appear unresponsive to UI benefit level shifts (studying
reforms that did not entail separations). We cannot credibly study wage effects in the present context given the large
attrition implied by the separation effects.
8UI benefits are not taxed. The net replacement ratio, UI benefits over the wage net of social security contributions
and income taxes is around 55%, slightly higher than in the US. See Ja¨ger et al. (2018) for details on replacement rates.
4
paid contributions to the UI system) for at least three out of the last five years, otherwise PBD
was 20 weeks. After exhaustion of UI, the unemployed can apply for unemployment assistance (UA,
“Notstandshilfe”). UA benefits are means-tested (on income of other household members) and granted
for successive 39-week periods, but could in principle be extended forever if eligibility is maintained.
UA benefits are capped at 92 percent of UI benefits; in 1990 the median paid UA was about 70 percent
of the median UI benefit. 59 [26] percent of the unemployed receive UI [UA].
1988-93 Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) In 1988, the Austrian government
enacted the Austrian Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP), a large expansion of potential
benefit duration for older (50+) workers in a subset of regions in the country. The policy motivation was
to mitigate labor market consequences of a crisis in the iron-, steel- and other heavy industries (“steel
sector” in the following). The state-owned company, the Oesterreichische Industrie AG (OeIAG), had
suffered from low commodity prices, shrinking markets, and low productivity since the mid-1970s.
In response, the new OeIAG management implemented a sequence of restructuring plans during the
1980s, leading to plant closures and downsizing.
The eligible labor market districts were selected by having a large share of employment in the steel
sector: in the REBP-regions, about 17% of workers were employed in the steel sector, compared around
5% in the Non-REBP-regions. Before REBP, treated and non-treated regions did not differ in terms
of the unemployment rate or the fraction of long-term unemployed.
REBP extended the maximum duration of UI benefits to 209 weeks. To become eligible, a job loser
had to satisfy each of the following criteria at the beginning of his or her unemployment spell: (i) age
50 or older; (ii) a continuous work history (780 employment weeks during the last 25 years prior to the
current unemployment spell); (iii) location of residence in one of 28 selected labor market districts for
at least 6 months prior to the claim; and (iv) start of a new unemployment spell after June 1988 or
spell in progress in June 1988. REBP did not impose any industry requirement. All unemployed who
met criteria (i) to (iv) were eligible, irrespective of whether they previously worked in the steel sector
or not. (To minimize UI policy endogeneity problems, our empirical analysis below excludes workers
employed in the steel sector.)
Figure 1a visualizes the changes to potential benefit duration brought about by the REBP reform
and by the economy-wide UI reform 1989. An additional reform changed potential benefit duration for
different groups of workers in August 1989 based on age and experience.9 Importantly, the economy-
wide 1989 reform is orthogonal to the regional variation we analyze and so does not confound the effects
of the REBP reform. First, it applied uniformly across the REBP and the control region. Secondly,
our econometric strategy absorbs age or cohort effects so that comparisons are always within the same
age group or cohort. That national 1989 reform raises PBD for workers aged 40 to 49 [50 and above]
to 39 [52] weeks with an experience requirement of 312 [468] weeks of employment in the last 10 [15]
years. Figure 1b provides a map of the affected regions.
Therefore, the reform induces variation in several dimensions: first, across age as we can compare
workers aged 50 and above to their younger peers and, second, across regions comparing the REBP
9The reform also increased the replacement rate from 41% to 47% in the monthly income bracket from 5,000 to 10,000
ATS, roughly US$ 400 to US$ 800 at the time.
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regions to regions not affected by the reform. The confluence of these factors along with the large
expansion in potential benefit duration makes the REBP reform an ideal setting in which to study
which workers and matches separate in response to improved outside options.
Abolition of the Program REBP was initially in effect until December 1991 before its was extended
in January 1992.10 REBP was then abolished (stopped accepting new entrants) on August 1, 1993,
though job seekers who established eligibility to REBP before August 1993 continued to be covered.
The abolition decision was formally announced as late as in June 1993, an implementation gap of
only two months. The program end occurred in a relatively abrupt fashion: In fact, the Austrian
government had come up with a plan in January 1993 to expand access to longer benefit duration
to older unemployed workers in all Austrian regions from one to four years along with changes in
the eligibility requirements.11 In the following weeks and months, the government reversed course
completely and abolished the REBP program.
Interaction of UI with Other Social Policies UI interacts with other welfare state programs.
In particular, REBP could effectively serve as a bridge into permanent non-employment and hence
changed the incentives for men aged 50 and older to leave the labor force. In the absence of the REBP,
unemployed men could effectively retire early at age 58 by claiming unemployment benefits for one
year and special income support for one other year,12 before drawing a regular public pension at age
60 (the retirement age for male workers with at least 35 years of insurance contributions). Since the
REBP extended the maximum duration of UI benefits by three years,13 eligible workers could already
permanently withdraw from the labor force at age 55.
Another important program was disability insurance (DI). During the study period, the Austrian
system granted relaxed access to a DI pension from age 55 onward. DI applicants below age 55 get
a DI pension when a health impairment reduces the work capacity by more than 50 percent in any
occupation. In contrast, DI applicants above age 55 are considered as disabled if their work capacity is
lower than 50 percent in the same occupation. In practice, this means that not only health- but also
employability-criteria establish DI access after age 55. In the REBP context, relaxed DI-entry at age
55 allowed job losers in REBP regions to retire already as young as age 51 while being on some kind
10The 1992 extension enacted two changes for new spells. First, the benefit extension was abolished in 6 of the original
28 regions. We exclude from our analysis the set of treated regions that were excluded after the 1991-reform. Second,
the 1992-extension tightened eligibility criteria for extended benefits: new beneficiaries had to be not only residents, but
also previously employed in a treated region.
11We confirm this course of events in a newspaper content analysis. For instance, Der Standard (a major Austrian
newspaper) reported in an article entitled “La¨nger Geld fu¨r alle Altersarbeitslosen (Longer benefits for all unemployed
workers)” from January 9, 1993: “All older unemployed workers throughout Austria - and not only in [REBP regions]
as in the past - will be eligible for unemployment benefits of four years instead of one. Minister of Social Affairs, Josef
Hesoun, and the social partners have agreed in principle on this [...].” [translation by the authors].
12For men, our sample, special income support is a program available for unemployed workers during the last year
before they can claim the regular public pension. For workers with long insurance durations, the statutory retirement
age was 60 (unemployed women aged 59) during the study period. Special income support was therefore available at age
59. Special income support is equivalent to UI spell in legal terms, but with 25 percent higher benefits, paid for a period
of at most 12 months).
13To be precise, the REBP extended UI duration by 3 years for job losers after August 1989 (when the maximum UI
benefit duration was 52 weeks), but for 3.44 years (= 209 weeks – 30 weeks) before August 1989 (when the maximum UI
benefit duration was still 30 weeks).
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of benefit up until age 60 when the public pension could be claimed.
Advance Notice for Layoffs, Works Councils, and Severance Pay While employment pro-
tection is not as stringent as in many other (particularly Southern European) countries, an Austrian
firm firing a worker has to obey a set of rules. At the time of the REBP, the firm had to give advance
notice, which amounted to 5 [4, 3, 2, 1.5] months for workers with at least 25 [15, 5, 2] years of tenure.
Workers, too, are obliged to give a (one-month) advance notice.
The Austrian labor law provides a role for works councils in the firing process. In firms with 5 or
more employees, workers can organize in works councils. The firm has to inform and consult the works
council when a layoff is planned and if the firms fails to do so, the layoff is void. If a layoff violates
substantial interests of the worker, the firm has to prove that the layoff is economically necessary
for the survival of the firm. The works council must also be consulted when choosing the particular
worker to be fired. The works council ensures that potential hardships of layoffs candidates are taken
into account, which provides some employment protection for older and longer-tenured workers. Mass
layoffs in larger firms are subject to specific further rules. Firms with more than 100 employees that
reduce employment by more than 5 percent (or more than 50 employees) within one month must give
written notice to the regional employment agency, one month before the mass layoff is implemented,
where failure to notify renders the mass layoff void.
In case of a layoff, the firm has to make a severance payment to the worker. The amount is a step
function of worker tenure: 3 (5, 10, 15, 20, 25) years of tenure map into 2 (3, 4, 6, 9, 12) monthly
salaries, and zero below three years. Severance payments are only due for the following separation
types: layoffs (but not dismissals for cause), job terminations upon mutual agreement (between firm
and worker), and after the end of a temporary contract. In contrast, worker-induced quits were exempt
from the severance-pay rule, except for workers with more than 10 years of tenure.
Data and Sample The Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) is a matched employer-employee
data set covering the universe of private-sector and non-tenured public sector employees in Austria
from 1972 onward (Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009).14 We additionally use the Austrian Labor Force Survey or
Micro Census (“Mikrozensus”) to trace the nature of separations by type (quits, layoffs, other reasons).
The Austrian Micro Census samples representatively based on administrative population registries and
follows a rotating panel of households.
We drop all individuals working in the steel sector because the reform was targeted on these workers
who presumably face worse labor market prospects. Likewise, we drop the 6 regions that were covered
by the REBP only until 1991. We also drop women for data and institutional reasons.15 The majority
of our sample fulfilled the experience requirement; since this sample restriction turned out to not
effect our estimates, we present the unconditional results. We report summary statistics for our main
14We complement the ASSD with the Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs on employment histories before 1972, to
determine whether or not a worker is eligible for REBP (which is based on work experience within the last 25 years). In
practice, the experience test was conducted on the basis of similar data.
15First, whereas old age insurance rules allow men to retire at age 60, women can retire at age 55. The second reason
is that individuals must have been employed in 15 out of the last 25 years in order to be eligible for REBP. Since we
cannot observe all 25 years prior to the reform, it is likely that classification errors arise for women, who due to childcare
typically have a less continuous work history than men.
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analyses in Table 1. In our empirical analysis of the direct effects of REBP during 1988 and 1993, we
will often focus on workers up until 55, for whom the reform made the largest and cleanest difference
due to the early-retirement programs described above.
3 Large Separation Effects from the REBP Unemployment Insur-
ance Benefit Extension
In this section, we estimate that the differential benefit extension (from 52 to 209 weeks) increased job
separations among eligible workers by 11.2ppt (28%) among initial matches over the five year program
horizon, in the treated cohorts compared to their ineligible peers. Most of these excess separations
were into long-term unemployment followed by early retirement, rather than to employment with
other firms. We present visual evidence of raw data before turning to regression estimates, to assess
the parallel trends assumptions underlying our research design.
Plotting Raw Data: Cohort Gradients of Separations We sort the population of 1988 job
holders (the onset of the reform) by month-of-birth cohorts and into REBP and non-REBP regions,
and then plot outcomes over the course of REBP in Figures 2 and 3. Each figure presents levels for each
cohort by region, and the within-cohort, between-region difference. Younger cohorts born after 1943
turned 50 after the REBP was abolished in 1993 and therefore could never claim extended benefits
under the program. Older cohorts born before 1933, while eligible for extended benefits, were older
than 55 at the time the REBP was initiated in 1988 and, at that age, also had access to more generous
disability/early retirement benefits with relaxed entry conditions. Moreover, they had reached the male
retirement age of 60 before the program’s abolition in 1993 so that these older cohorts separated by
1993 even in the control region. The intermediate cohorts, born between 1933 and 1943, were exposed
to the reform in REBP regions. Exposure to extended benefits was maximal for the cohort born in
1938, who turned 50 at the onset of the reform in 1988 and was then exposed to the reform until it
was abolished in 1993, when the 1938 cohort turned 55.
We then plot raw data of the fraction of workers in a cohort-region group that separates from their
1988 (defined as a worker-establishment match) by the third quarter of 1993, the first quarter after the
REBP had been abolished. We assign workers by the location of their 1988q2 establishment and leave
out workers in the 6 regions eligible for the REBP only through 1991 (TR1 regions in Figure 1b).
The red and blue lines of Figure 2(a) show the share of workers in the REBP and control region who
had separated from their 1988 employer by 1993. We start from the left, with the older cohorts, our
first control group. There is a clear cohort gradient, indicating that older workers’ 1988-93 separation
share is naturally much higher. For example, the cohorts born before 1933 had mostly retired by the
end of the REBP, and therefore hardly any workers in these birth cohorts were still employed with
their 1988 employer by 1993.
Our young control group – ineligible cohorts born after 1943 – exhibits a separation rate of roughly
40 percent in both regions, and differences between REBP and control regions are flat. The flat pre- and
post-trends – small level differences for control (younger and older) cohorts – validate the identification
assumptions of our difference-in-differences design by suggesting that labor market conditions were
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comparable in REBP and control regions during the study period.
Separations are markedly higher for affected cohorts in REBP regions (but not in the non-REBP
region), representing the treatment effect of REBP. At its peak, the difference in the share is about 20
percentage points relative to a control region share of about 50 percent.
Potential remaining confounders are shocks or unobservables in separation behavior that vary at the
region-by-age level. For instance, pathways to retirement could differ between regions as a consequence
of different industry structures. To address this concern, we switch to age instead of cohort, now
studying workers’ separations from their job at age 50 by age 55.16 Figures 2(c) and (d) show that
separations between the ages of 50 and 55 increased sizeably in cohorts exposed to the REBP relative
to older and younger non-exposed cohorts, again compared to the gradients in the control region.
The job separation probability falls steadily from around 30 percent in older cohorts to just above 50
percent in younger cohorts in the control region (blue line, Figure 2(c)). While the pattern for the
pre-1933 and post-1943 cohorts is similar in the REBP regions with slightly higher shares throughout,
separations rise sharply for the treated, intermediate cohorts born between 1933 and 1943. As Figure
2(d) shows, the magnitude of the increase at peak is around 20 percentage points.
Building on the lifecycle perspective, in Appendix Figure A.3, we provide a “flip-book” that de-
scribes the year-by-year dynamics of the five-year treatment effect. We plot variants of Figures 2(c)
and (d) from the quarter before turning 50 to the quarter before turning 55, indicating via a vertical
dashed line the cohort that became newly eligible at that age. The figure reveals a clear spike in sepa-
rations when workers age into eligibility, or at the onset of REBP for the older workers who were born
before 1938 and therefore become immediately eligible. This spike suggests the presence of “pent-up”
marginal matches with persistent heterogeneity in surplus in our sample.
Finally, Figure 3 plots quarters employed (panels (a) and (b)) and unemployed (panels (c) and (d))
between 1988q2 and 1993q3, mirroring Figure 2.17 For the non-exposed younger and older cohorts,
pre- and post-trends are flat and even the levels are remarkably similar. For the cohorts exposed to the
reform, Figure 3 reveals an economically significant decrease of employment and a tantamount increase
in unemployment of almost four and three quarters at peak, respectively. We find similar results when
we consider the sample of employed workers at age 50 and track their employment outcomes through
age 55 (see Appendix Figure A.2).
Regression Estimates of Treatment Effect We complement the graphical evidence with regres-
sion estimates on the average treatment effect in Table 2, in a difference-in-differences specification on
the population of workers holding a job in 1988 before the onset of the reform with fixed effects for
region r and cohort c:
Drci = β + φr + ψc + ν · REBPr × Treated Cohortc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zrc
+χrci, (1)
16In practice, we select the job in the quarter before the 50th birthday (right before aging into REBP eligibility), and
the separation outcome in quarter before turning 55 (as the disability and early retirement incentives changed at 55).
17We also produce analogous figures using other employment statuses, in particular disability, as outcomes as well as
the number of quarters that an individual is observed in the social security data between the ages of 50 and 55. We do
not find effects of the reform on the prevalence of these additional labor market statuses.
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where Drci are various outcomes described below, for worker i in region r born in cohort c. The
coefficient of interest ν captures the effect of REBP eligibility Zrc.
18 The model includes a region
effect φr and cohort effects ψc. Our regression specification thus exploits within-region, within-cohort
variation. In the main specifications we report, we cluster standard errors at the level of administrative
regions (groups of districts, Arbeitsamtsbezirke) but have also assessed robustness for clustering at
other levels. Our main table reports on the cohort-based design (1998-93 outcomes) in Table 2; we
additionally report the age-based estimates (50-55) in Table A.2, finding similar results. Our sample
is composed of workers born between July 1933 and July 1948; we do not use older cohorts because
they had mostly retired by 1993. We keep the young control cohorts to a five-year range to isolate the
workers most comparable to the older, treated cohorts in the labor market. As in the raw data plots,
we ignore workers in the few municipalities where the REBP was abolished early.
Table 2 column (1) shows our main result: an 11.2 ppt increase in separations among initially
employed workers. Relative to the control group mean of 41.0% this represents about a 28% increase
in separations. The 95% confidence interval for the separation effect ranges from 2.4 to 20.0 ppt.
We then split the effects on separations into the two possible types: separations either into non-
employment (E-N separations) or into new jobs (E-E separations). REBP-induced separations are
entirely made up of the former. In column (2), we report a sizable increase in E-N separations of 16.2
ppt (se 5.2 ppt). Meanwhile, the REBP program decreased E-E separations, with a point estimate of
-5.1 ppt (se 1.4 ppt) in column (3). However this effect is statistically insignificant when investigating
the age horizon (age 50 to 55) rather than years (see Appendix Table A.2), suggesting that unobserved
differences at the region-by-age level play a role in E-E separation behavior. Column (4) of Table 2
reports effects on quarters employed, finding a negative effect of 4.5 months (se 1.1). Column (5) reports
that quarters unemployed increased by a similar order of magnitude (3.1 months, se 1.6). Column (6)
shows that a large share of the decrease in employment can be accounted for by a reduction of 3.1
months (se 1.2) in employment with the initial employer, such that our setting does not represent the
standard temporary layoffs mechanism (Feldstein, 1976).
Taken together, the evidence therefore cleanly shows that REBP benefit extensions triggered a large
number of separations (11.2ppt or 28% increase), shorter employment with the initial employer, and
a tantamount increase in unemployment. This effect comes in response to a treatment 209 weeks of
potential benefit duration compared to 52 weeks in the older control group, i.e. a differential four-fold
increase in potential duration of UI benefits.19
4 Puzzle to the Coasean Hypothesis: No Attenuated Separations
Among REBP Survivors After its Surprise Abolition in 1993
Next, we exploit the surprise abolition of the reform in August 1993 (described in Section 2) to study
whether REBP “survivors” – jobs that existed before the onset of the reform in 1988 and continued
18Workers are eligible if they reside in the REBP region, REBPr, and are members of a treated cohort, i.e. such that
they were aged between 50 and 55 at some point between the start of the program in 1988 and its end in 1993.
19Both groups had at most 30 weeks PBD in 1988, but a national reform in 1989 increased that level to 52 weeks,
leading us to choose this benchmark given the program duration through 1993.
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through its abolition in 1993 – subsequently exhibited lower separations unconditionally and in response
to identified labor demand shocks.20
We find that, after the abolition of the reform, the “survivors” in the dramatically shrunk former
treatment group exhibited exactly the same separation behavior as the control group – on average, and
in response to industry and firm labor demand shifts. Together, the large quantity of REBP-induced
separations before 1993, and the zero differential post-REBP behavior, present a clean and transparent,
and largely model-free, test of a core prediction of the Coasean view of jobs. We will dedicate the rest
of the paper to understanding this result.21
4.1 Background on Coasean Prediction: Missing Mass of Marginal Jobs in For-
merly Treated Group
Here we lay out out the intuitions of our conceptual framework, which we present as a formal model
in our structural estimation in Section 5.
The Coasean benchmark of jobs implies an ordered set of marginal jobs that drive separations in
response to any surplus-relevant shock: small shocks will destroy jobs with small joint surplus, larger
shocks will destroy jobs with larger joint surplus. Hence, the REBP shock – which reduced surplus by
boosting worker’s nonemployment outside option – ought to have shifted the composition of surviving
employment relationships towards jobs with higher initial surplus, or gross-of-REBP surplus. If outside
options are subsequently reduced again, the allocative surplus distribution of the surviving jobs would
be shifted to the right and therefore left-truncated, setting the density of jobs below the truncation
point to zero.
That missing mass of marginal matches would equal the mass of compliers: the treatment effect of
REBP on separations, which we estimated in the previous section. Unlike in the previous analysis, we
now naturally do not expect the sample to be similar: in fact, we know that the older cohorts in the
REBP region underwent a dramatic policy that removed an extra 11.2ppt of workers from their ranks,
increasing separations by around 28% (Table 2, Column (1)).
A testable prediction of the Coasean view of jobs is that after the REBP abolition, the overall
group of REBP survivors should be more resilient – have higher surplus and hence lower separation
rates – compared to control group, where these marginal, low-surplus jobs are still present.
By contrast, non-Coasean settings – spelled out in detail in Section 5 – do not feature a one-
dimensional ordering of jobs by joint surplus. For example, suppose that wages were rigid or firing
restrictions were active, so that REBP selected workers into separation based solely on worker surplus
rather than joint job surplus. Then, that group may still be more sensitive to worker surplus, but
not to shocks that primarily affect firm surplus (for a given wage). In other words, the matches that
20That is, we essentially test for a dynamic known as “harvesting effects” in demography (see, e.g., Schwartz, 2000;
Basu, 2009), usually applied to transitory negative health shocks (e.g., heat waves) that induce low-health individuals
into exit and hence reduce the subsequent average mortality rate of the survivors.
21A previous conference draft version of our research reported on high dimensional interaction effects and parametric
reduced-form specifications testing for resilience. That specification turned out to suggest spurious resilience arising
from the inclusion industry fixed effects with leave-out-mean industry employment shifts as the dependent variable, with
hard-to-evaluate residual variation in a triple interaction. That result further was not robust to variations in the surplus
shock variable to separation rather than employment growth, or to instrumenting for Austrian employment growth with
German industry growth.
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separated in response to REBP need not have been the matches with low firm surplus.22
4.2 Baseline Results
Plotting Raw Data: Post-REBP Separation Rate Gradients by Cohort In Figures 4 (levels)
and 5 (differences) we plot the post-REBP separation gradient by cohort for “REBP survivors” in the
treatment group and the control groups: the jobs already active right before the onset of REBP in
1988 that continued through its abolition in 1993. In practice, we allow for REBP spillovers due to
layoff notices and explicit grandfathering that the law permitted for pre-scheduled layoffs (see Section
2).23 Hence, our cutoff is 1994q1. Except for this sample restriction, the figures mirror the cohort
gradients of separations in Figures 2 and 3. We explore the fraction of REBP survivors subsequently
separating at various horizons.
Figures 4 and 5 reveal that there are no post-REBP separation differences whatsoever among
surviving jobs exposed to the REBP compared to those those that did not.
Both figures feature a yellow dashed line, which represents the predicted gradient from the Coasean
model, which we formally derive and discuss in Section 5, and for now note that the gap between the
prediction and the Coasean benchmark is quantitatively large, confirming that our test has power.
Regression Evidence To gauge quantitative effects and to assess confidence intervals, we again
estimate the difference-in-differences model in Equation (1) on the current sample (REBP stayers) and
the post-REBP separation outcomes. We choose 1994–1996 as one example but report the full set of
horizons in Appendix Section F. Specifically, we track the labor market status of “REBP survivors”
from 1994q1 through 1996q1, following the same birth cohorts and regions but with the additional
“survival” restriction of being observed in the same establishment in 1988q2 and 1994q1. Just as in
the previous section, we ignore those working in the regions where REBP was abolished in January
1992. We estimate, for a series of indicator outcomes,
Drci = β + φr + ψc + ν · REBPr × Formerly Treated Cohortc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zrc
+χrci, (2)
where φr and ψc are region and cohort fixed effects. As before, we cluster standard errors at the
administrative region level. The coefficient of interest remains ν, the difference-in-differences between
REBP-eligible and -ineligible cohorts and regions.
We report results in Table 3. This basic difference-in-differences analysis of post-abolition sepa-
ration behavior suggests that, if anything, separation rates are slightly higher (1.3ppt off a base of
24.5%) and employment spells slightly shorter (a fifth of a month, off a base of 24 months) among the
formerly treated group.
22A third view, which we lay out in the model in Section 5, permits for some convergence of the distributions, such
that the Coasen view may be somewhat masked.
23This grandfathering likely played a role in the additional increased separation rate in the REBP region immediately
after the program’s abolition. Appendix Figure A.4 documents these additional separations by separating the within-
cohort regional difference from 1993q3 to 1994q1 into quintiles of industry growth over the same time period. In Section
5.5, we clarify that a version of the non-Coasean model can rationalize these patterns even without grandfathering.
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4.3 Labor Demand Shocks
We present a series of additional results below to illustrate the robustness of the absence of differen-
tial post-REBP separation behavior. We have conducted a long series of robustness checks, largely
unreported, that confirmed the absence of differential post-REBP separation. Here, we test whether
negative labor demand shocks may unmask the potentially underlying missing mass of marginal matches
that, by the Coasean view, should render the formerly treated group less sensitive to shocks. Both at
the industry and at the establishment level, we find that separation behaviors of the groups remain
indistinguishable.
Heterogeneity by Industry Growth Since we study the separation margin, the Coasean bench-
mark would predict resilience to negative shocks in particular. We therefore plot the differential
separation rates among jobs that survived REBP separately for the top, middle and bottom tercile of
the industry growth distribution from 1994 onward in Figure 6. Even in declining industries (all in the
1st tercile), when joint surplus is arguably shrinking, REBP cohorts do not exhibit relative resilience
compared to the control group.
Establishment-Level “Hockey Sticks” We construct proxies for separation-inducing establish-
ment labor demand shocks by building on the “hockey stick” graphs (Davis et al., 2013): net establish-
ment growth (on the x-axis) is associated with increasing hiring rates for positive growth, but exhibits
a kink at zero. The negative growth region features a steeply negative slope of separation rates, im-
plying resort to separations (layoffs) more and more for net negative growth. Exploiting the matched
employer-employee dimension of our population data, we replicate these graphs in Figure 7(a), where
we plot average annual separation rates (of men employed in Q1) by bins of annual establishment
growth rates.24
Figure 7(b) plots cohort-region-specific hiring and separation rates through 1996, among the sample
of jobs that survived the REBP period through 1994q1. We focus on cohorts from 1936 through 1948 to
avoid retiring cohorts. The results are naturally noisier due to the shrinking sample but are informative
because the Coasean view would predict that separations occur by a pecking order following the ranking
of job surplus. We estimate linear slopes separately for shrinking and growing establishments and for
four separate groups: by birth cohort eligibility (born July 1936- July 1943 vs. August 1943-July 1948)
and regional eligibility (being a stayer in a REBP region or not).
The slopes for the old ineligible, non-REBP workers and the formerly treated and formerly eligible
old workers in the REBP group lie almost on top of each other. This provides additional evidence that
the massive extraction of potentially marginal jobs due to REBP does not seem to affect subsequent
layoffs (or separators) at firms.25
24We focus on establishments with at least 25 employees and on years 1994 through 1998. We exclude cohorts born
before 1933 since they are past the male retirement age of 60 in 1994, and establishment spin-offs, take-overs, and
administrative changes to the administrative data using the procedure outlined in Fink et al. (2010).
25We also experimented with plotting the relationship for firm cells where the treatment effects were particularly
pronounced, and the patterns remained robust.
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Lastly, we report cohort-specific slopes, estimating for each birth-year cohort c and region r,
Sepi,1994+t =
∑
c
∑
r
βc,r1 ·
(
EmpGrowthe(i),1994+t × 1(EmpGrowthe(i),1994+t < 0)× 1c,r
)
+
∑
c
∑
r
βc,r2 · (EmpGrowthe(i),1994+t × 1c,r)
+
∑
c
∑
r
βc,r3 · (1(EmpGrowthe(i),1994+t < 0)× 1c,r)
+
∑
c
∑
r
βc,r4 · 1c,r + ξi,
(3)
where Sepi,1994+t is an indicator of whether a worker i employed in 1994q1 is still employed with the
same establishment e in Q1 of year 1994 + t. Our sample on the left-hand side are again the 1988-94
job stayers. EmpGrowthe(i),1994+t is the change in total establishment employment between 1994q1
and Q1 of year 1994 + t, in establishment e where individual i is employed in 1994. 1c,r is an indicator
for being in cohort c and region r. The coefficient of interest is βc,r1 +β
c,r
2 , the sensitivity of separations
to downsizing at the establishment level by year of birth c and region r.
Figure 7(c) plots the estimates from this regression for separations/growth rates from 1994 to 1996
(t = 2), with similar results for other years. In both the REBP and the non-REBP region, the 1988-94
job stayers (REBP survivors) exhibit a downward-sloping sensitivity gradient in birth date, indicating
that older workers appear shielded from a given establishment shrinkage event, perhaps due to seniority
rules (see Section 2), larger job values for human capital reasons, or lower outside options among these
older workers (Oi, 1962). Yet, the lines lie on top of each other (in fact, the REBP cohort appears
sligthly more exposed to firm shocks): REBP and non-REBP birth cohort exhibit the same sensitivity
of separations to negative establishment labor demand shifts.
5 Model and Structural Estimation: Which Share of REBP Separa-
tions Were Coasean?
In this section, we provide a formal quantitative assessment about the share of jobs whose separation
behavior was consistent with Coasean separations, by deriving and then structurally estimating a
formal model of Coasean and frictional job separations.
5.1 Two Benchmark Models of Jobs and Separations: Coasean vs. Non-Coasean
Separations
The framework formalizes how improvements in worker outside option affect separations and truncate
the distribution of job surplus among the surviving jobs, generating a missing mass of marginal matches.
In consequence in the Coasean setting, the formerly-treated group should be less sensitive to any
subsequent negative shocks, in stark contrast to our empirical findings. We then also present one
alternative non-Coasean setting that can rationalize our results.
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Jobs and Surplus Generally, jobs carry worker surplus SW and firm surplus SF , each of which must
be non-negative: each party i ∈ {W,F}’s inside job value V iIn (amenities, productivity,...) plus/minus
the wage, amounts to at least her (separation) outside value V iOut:
SW (VW , w) = V WIn + w − V WOut ≥ 0, (4)
SF (VF , w) = V FIn − w − V FOut ≥ 0, (5)
where V = {V ia}i∈{W,F};a∈{In,Out}, and sometimes Vi = {V ia}a∈{In,Out}. Alternatively, we can define
joint job surplus, which the wage splits between the worker and firm:
S(V) =
SW (VW ,w)+SF (VW ,w)︷ ︸︸ ︷
V WIn + V
F
In − V WOut − V FOut . (6)
Figure 8 Panel (a) plots the two-dimensional job space. The x-axis denotes worker surplus, and the
y-axis denotes firm surplus. The figure plots various case studies of jobs characterized by different
surplus coordinates. The solid circles (•) denote gross-of-wage surpluses, i.e. V WIn (b)− V WOut(b) for the
worker and V FIn (b) − V FOut(b) for the firm. This is the surplus combination these job “fundamentals”
would trigger before wage setting, or equivalently in the scenario of a zero wage. The empty circles
(◦) denote net of wage surpluses: for each gross job, we provide various examples of potential wages.
Wages move net surpluses of the parties along the 135 degree line: the iso-joint-surplus line.
The figure also partitions jobs into four regions of viability: feasible jobs (north east, solid line),
quits (north west, dashed line), layoffs (south east, dotted line) and mutual separations (south west,
dot-dash-patterned line). For a job to be viable, it must be in the north east corner, providing positive
surplus to both parties. Three natures of separations are represented by the three remaining corners.
Quits emerge if the worker is in negative surplus territory, while the firm would prefer to continue. This
case would emerge in job A, which is “born” such a potential quit case. Yet, thanks to redistribution in
form of a positive wage, the job is moved into the viable quadrant, A1. The wage can also “overshoot”:
job A2 has too high a wage, playing the job firmly into positive territory from the worker’s perspective,
but pushing it into negative firm surplus territory, leading to a layoff, along with all jobs in the south
east quadrant. By contrast, job B is “born” in the feasible region even without a wage, as one would
imagine with, e.g., an internship or a high-amenity job, for which workers would work for free. Yet
the figure plots two ways to have wages entail separations: B1 has too positive a wage, leading to a
layoff. B2 has a too negative a wage, entailing a quit. Job C goes one step further, where a no-wage
scenario would have the firm prefer a layoff, but too low (negative) a wage would entail a quit (C1),
whereas any positive wage would leave the job in layoff territory (C2). By contrast, doomed jobs such
as X are born in negative surplus territory for both parties, and so provide negative joint surplus such
that no wage can be found to fulfill both participation constraints. Wages in the south west quadrant
hence entail a mutual separation (otherwise a quit or layoff). Finally, M is a “marginal” job, carrying
exactly zero joint surplus. That job is born in, e.g., quit territory, but can be rendered feasible with
a unique wage that moves that job into the origin, where both parties enjoy exactly zero unilateral
surplus. Any increase [decrease] from that wage will entail a layoff [quit].
15
Coasean Bargaining In the Coasean (i.e. efficient bargaining) benchmark, the two-dimensional
condition for job viability, Equations (4) and (5), collapses to a one-dimensional, single condition.
This is because the parties find a wage within the bargaining set of reservation wages w ∈ [wW , wF ],
any of which implements the bilaterally efficient allocation: forming and maintaining matches that
carry non-negative joint – rather than private – job surplus (i.e. whenever wF ≥ wW ).26 The essence
of the Coasean setup is that the parties find a wage to split the joint surplus to leave both participation
constraints fulfilled. In the figure, this means that jobs move along the iso-joint-surplus curve, the 135-
degree line. Efficient bargaining renders feasible all jobs along a positive iso-joint-surplus line (i.e.
north east of the marginal-jobs frontier).
Non-Coasean Bargaining With frictions that prevent such efficient and flexible bargaining, e.g.,
wage rigidity, the Coasean allocation is not necessarily attainable. In our model depicted in Figure 8
Panel (a), such frictions prevent the parties from moving towards a wage in the feasible-jobs frontier
even though the job carries positive joint surplus, thereby shrinking the set of feasible jobs in the set of
jobs with values V. Going forward, we think of wage w as one additional job attribute that can evolve
or be fixed, such that jobs are now characterized by (w,V), and unilateral worker and firm surpluses
SW (w,V) and SF (w,V) are allocative.
Below, we formally explain why our evidence from unique empirical laboratory of the REBP reform
rejects the Coasean hypothesis in favor of the non-Coasean view, and we derive our estimating equa-
tions.
The UI Extension (REBP) We think of the treatment, an increase in UI generosity (a binary
variable Z ∈ {0, 1} such that bZ = b0 + Z ×∆b, with Z = 1 for the treatment group and Z = 0 for
the control group), as primarily improving the worker’s outside option V WOut(b), such that the worker
surplus size of the shock is εWb = V
W
Out(b0)−V WOut(b0 + ∆b) > 0, where our convention is that a positive
εWb denotes a negative shock.
27 In our Austrian context, described in Section 2, even worker-sided quits
receive full benefits (after a brief waiting period). There is no experience rating. UI take-up is high.
Alternatively, due to moral hazard and efficiency-wage mechanisms, the worker’s improved outside
option may lower productivity (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Katz, 1986) and
thus the firm’s inside value, V FIn (b0). Or, surplus may fall if implicit firing costs fall when workers
stand to lose less from a separation, in effect increasing V FOut(b).
28 Still, these alternative mechanisms
26For example, by Nash bargaining, the worker (firm) receives their outside option [or reservation wage], plus fraction
β (resp. 1− β), the party’s bargaining power, of the surplus (the reservation wage difference):
max
w
(
[VWIn + w]− VWOut
)β
·
(
[V FIn − w]− V FOut
)1−β
⇒ wN = [VWOut − VWIn ] + β · S = wW + β · [wF − wW ].
27For exposition, the surplus shock is modeled as homogeneous for all workers. With heterogeneous treatment effects,
marginal jobs also comprise workers with particularly large shock valuation.
28For example, since firms may backload compensation due to agency concerns, firms’ flow surplus and the continuation
value from older workers is negative gross of firing costs, generated, e.g., by the erosion of the firm’s reputation to honor
such implicit contracts (Lazear, 1979, 1981; Hall and Lazear, 1984; Bewley, 2002). b may also enter the firm’s separation
value through shifts in recruitment costs or quality of replacement hires. However, our empirical design would net out
this mechanism with a similar yet ineligible slightly younger control group presumably close substitutes to and in the
same labor market as the slightly older colleagues.
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ultimately arise from the worker’s outside option. In Appendix A, we calculate the cash value of the
reform as 71% of a worker’s annual salary.
5.2 Effects of REBP in the Coasean Setting
Intuitions To study the group-level effects of REBP, we now switch gears from individual job case
studies to the distribution of heterogeneous jobs. Figure 9 depicts, as our expositional example, the
contour maps of the joint distribution of worker and firm surplus embedded in the four quadrants of
Figure 8 Panel (a) and illustrates the evolution of jobs, the treatment effect of REBP, which jobs it
destroyed, and the consequences for post-REBP job dynamics. The figure plots the Coasean (efficient
bargaining, left panels) and non-Coasean (fixed-wage, right panels) settings. The figures plot contour
maps of the density of the joint distribution of firm (y-axis) and worker (x-axis) surpluses; darker
shades indicate higher densities, at the example of a bivariate normal distribution.
We start with the Coasean setting in Panels (a.C), (b.C), and (c.C). Panel (a.C) depicts how REBP
lowers joint surplus by εWb = V
W
Out(b + ∆b) − V WOut(b) > 0. That is, REBP shifts all potential jobs to
the west, along worker surplus, by εWb and thereby extracts – pushes into separation – all matches with
“gross-of-εWb ” surplus below ε
W
b . These jobs drive the treatment effect on separations documented in
Section 3.
After REBP is abolished, depicted in Figure 9 Panels (b.C) and (c.C), all surviving matches’ surplus
is restored again to their peer in the control group, except that the abolition does not bring back to
life the previously destroyed jobs – since we track survivors only. The former treatment group features
a missing mass of marginal matches with respect to REBP. This gap is indicated by a parallel gap
between the surviving matches and the zero-joint-surplus line. By contrast, these low-surplus jobs
continue to be present in the former control group.
The testable prediction characterizing the Coasean view is that the former treated group should
exhibit dramatic insensitivity to any post-REBP surplus shocks compared to the control group. Figure
9 Panels (b.C) and (c.C) illustrate this feature in form of shifts in the worker component of surplus
to the west, which moves the job down the ranking of iso-joint-surplus lines. But as long as the
subsequent shock is smaller than the REBP shocks, it will not entail any separations. Importantly, in
the Coasean setting, the same resilience would emerge with an equally sized – southward – decline in
firm surplus. Hence due to efficient (re-)bargaining and hence joint surplus serving as the allocative
concept, the missing mass of low-joint-surplus matches emerging from REBP henceworth isolates the
formerly treated group’s REBP survivors’ separations to subsequent surplus shocks of either kind.
Formal Model Formally and more generally, separations (during [after] REBP denoted by δ [∆])
occur if S′ were to turn negative, either aggregate shocks (e.g., εWb from the shift in UI benefits) or
idiosyncratic shocks (health, productivity, amenities,...) following Markov process k(V′|V), where,
going forward, x′ denotes the next-period value of x. We define S˜(V′) as the short-hand for the
surplus level gross of a given aggregate surplus shifter, such that, for an aggregate shock −ε′ < 0,
S˜(V′, ε′ = 0) = S(V′, ε′) − ε′. For REBP, ε′ = εWb , and hence separations in the treatment [control]
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group Z = 1[= 0] are:
δZ =
∫
V
∫
V′
1(S˜(V′) < Z × εWb )k(V′|V)fZpre(V)dV′dV. (7)
where fpre(.) denotes the distribution prevailing at the onset of REBP, where we will assume that
initial distributions are the same across groups f0pre(.) = f
1
pre(.). In Appendix Table A.1, we confirm
this condition for observable characteristics. By contrast, fZ will denote post-REBP distributions that
will naturally diverge due to REBP.
Separations are efficient: all gains from trade are exhausted in that no wage w can be found to
fulfill both parties’ participation constraints. The marginal jobs extracted by REBP make up set
M = {V : 0 ≤ S˜(V) < εWb }. The wider set in the control group is J = {V : S˜(V) ≥ 0}, hence prone
to separations for even small negative shocks.
We discuss the role of idiosyncratic shocks in Section 5, but henceforth suppose that in the short
run, convergence through idiosyncratic shocks k(.|.) are of limited importance: the Markov process
is the identity matrix I, such that job values remain constant, i.e. V′ = V, ∀V. In practice, the
condition for resilience is some persistence in surplus in the very short run (one year in our case), so
that separations simplify to the case illustrated in Figure 9:
δZ =
∫
V
1(S˜(V′) < Z × εWb )fZpre(V)dV, (8)
and the treatment effect estimated Section 3 simplifies to
δ1 − δ0 =
∫
V
∫
V′
1(0 ≤ S(V′) < εWb )k(V′|V)dV′)f0pre(V)dV =
∫
V
1(0 ≤ S˜(V) < εWb )f0pre(V)dV
=
∫
V∈M
f0(V)dV.
(9)
where the last step follows from the absence of idiosyncratic shocks and our normalization that no
aggregate shock occurred during REBP except for the treatment. (In practice, idiosyncratic shocks
will have generated “always-separators”.)
After the abolition of REBP, the program has truncated the treatment group’s joint-surplus distri-
bution below εWb , such that density f
1(V) is zero, while the inframarginal REBP survivors reflect the
(conditional) distribution in the control group starting from truncation point εWb :
f1(V) =
{
0 if V 6∈ (J \M)⇔ S(V) < εWb
f0(V)
1−∫V∈M f0(V)dV if V ∈ (J \M)⇔ S(V) ≥ εWb .
(10)
The post-REBP resilience of the formerly treated group can be formalized by considering aggregate
(common to both groups) surplus shocks εF
′
and εW
′
:
∆Z =
∫
V
1(S˜(V′) < εW ′ + εF ′)fZ(V)dV. (11)
We now derive the separation rate of the former treatment group by replacing its densities as truncated
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versions of the control group’s, as following Equation (10):
∆1 =
1
1− ∫V∈M f0(V)dV
∫
V \M
1(S˜(V) < εW
′
+ εF
′
)f 0 (V)dV
=
1
1− ∫V∈M f0(V)dV
∫
V
1(S˜(V) < εW
′
+ εF
′
)f 0 (V)dV
− 1
1− ∫V∈M f0(V)dV
∫
V ∈M
1(S˜(V) < εW
′
+ εF
′
)f 0 (V)dV
=
1
1− ∫V∈M f0(V)dV ×
[
∆0 −
∫
V ∈M
1(S˜(V) < εW
′
+ εF
′
)f 0 (V)dV
]
.
(12)
Figure 8 Panels (b) and (c) depict treatment and control groups’ post-REBP separations as a function
of worker and firm surplus shock. The Coasean setting (approximated to no idiosyncratic shocks)
predicts resilience: both types of shocks leave the formerly treated group’s separations flat at zero
up until the point hits the truncation point of surplus (the REBP surplus threshold), and from that
point increases somewhat more steeply, eventually meeting the control group at 1 for very large surplus
shocks.
Using the last step of equation (9), we can rewrite expression (12) in an empirically tractable form
of realized control group post-REBP separation rates and the REBP treatment effect, as a sufficient
statistic for the (impossible to measure) surplus concepts:
⇒ ∆1Coasean = max
{
0,
1
1− (δ1 − δ0)
[
∆0 − (δ1 − δ0)]} . (13)
Figure 8 Panel (d) plots a theoretical version of Equation (13) (red dashed line), post-REBP treatment
group against control group separations. By the Coasean theory, no separations should occur in the
treatment group unless the control group separation rate exceeds the truncation point in the surplus
distribution (the share of marginal matches). Starting from that kink, the slope will be somewhat
steeper, as both groups will have separation rates of 100% if all control jobs dissolve.
Empirical Evaluation: Cohort Graphs To gauge the gap between the data and a benchmark
model, we compute and provide the predicted separations (yellow dashed line) following a strictly
interpreted Coasean view as presented in Equation (13). Specifically, for each cohort, we collect the
REBP separation rates building on the difference-in-difference results in Section 3 depicted in Figure
2 to proxy for δZ , and feed in post-REBP cohort-specific separation rates from the control group ∆0
(Figure 4). The yellow dashed line in Figures 4 (levels) and 5 (differences) plots this predicted Coasean
benchmark, along with the original realized post-REBP separation rates by cohort for the treatment
and control groups. The figures confirm that the design has power: For example, within the first year
(Figure 4(a)), the benchmark model would predict zero separations in the formerly treated group,
whereas the control group’s actual post-REBP separation rate hovers around 20% in these cohorts.29
The empirical separation rate in the formerly treated group nearly perfectly coincides with the control
29Separations spike once a birth cohort turns 60 years old, the age of retirement for Austrian men in this period.
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group, in stark contrast to the benchmark model. Moreover, Figures 4(b) through (d) clarify that
over longer horizons, the design retains power but the differences shrink, because the control group
separation increase, so that the difference between the two groups shrinks.
This benchmark clarifies that the absence of any attenuated separation responses whatsoever among
the treated cohorts documented in Section 4 is quantitatively significant because the effect induced by
the REBP on separations was so dramatic (Section 3 and Figures 2 and 3).
5.3 Effects of REBP in the Non-Coasean Setting
The evidence is therefore clearly inconsistent with the predictions from the Coasean model. We now
sketch out a non-Coasean alternative that, in particular, can generate the perfect comovement between
treatment and control groups.
Intuitions Building on the intuitions of job dynamics from the basic framework in Section 5.1 and
Figure 9 Panels (a.NC), (b.NC), and (c.NC), we next present the narrative of REBP and its aftermath
in the non-Coasean setting, again with the example of contour maps that now plot the density of the
joint distribution of firm (y-axis) and worker (x-axis) net of wage surpluses. Figure 9 Panel (a.NC)
illustrates the treatment effect documented in Section 3: REBP improved worker’s outside option. In
the non-Coasean setting with wages not following efficient (re-)bargaining, the incidence is therefore
on worker surplus, hence the treatment group’s jobs (joint distribution of worker and firm surplus)
shifts to east. While worker surplus may be large initially (before REBP, as in the control group),
REBP is large, and therefore pushes into separation marginal jobs with worker surplus. Rather than
the Coasean diagonal line of zero joint surplus, the inequality conditions allocative for separations are
now the unilateral participation constraints of positive worker surplus and positive firm surplus. As a
result the truncation in response to a worker surplus shift such as REBP (UI generosity that boosts
workers’ outside option) selects relatively low worker surplus jobs.
After REBP, Figure 9 Panel (a.NC) illustrates that the former treatment group features a missing
mass of marginal matches with respect to worker surplus shocks, but still contains just as many jobs
with low firm surplus. Figure 9 Panels (b.NC) and (c.NC) depict the post-REBP behavior in response
to firm and worker shocks, separately for the former treatment group (Panel (b.NC)) and control group
(Panel (c.NC)). Unlike in the Coasean setting, the survivors of REBP need not exhibit resilience despite
a large extraction of marginal (worker-surplus) jobs brought about by REBP. Post-REBP shocks to
firm surplus shift the jobs southward in both groups. The treatment group and the control group still
feature a similar share of marginal matches that now separate.
The explanation for why worker surplus shocks need not have a large differential effect is subtle but
intuitive: if worker surplus is relatively high to begin with in the older population that we study, the
truncation of worker surplus is quantitatively inconsequential for subsequent separation behavior since
even the control group features hardly any separations to that shock.30 The figure clarifies that REBP
was a large shock that even reached deep into the worker surplus distribution to cause – otherwise
inframarginal – workers to separate. In Section 5.5 below, we discuss why such a correlation may
naturally arise in our sample of older workers.
30Alternatively, shocks to worker surplus may be smaller compared to firm shocks.
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Formal Model Formally, the jobs destroyed by REBP had worker surplus between 0 and εWb ,
and the non-Coasean set of matches marginal to REBP are MNC = {(w′,V′) : 0 ≤ SW (w′,V′) <
εWb ∧ SF (w′,V′) ≥ 0}. By contrast, the distribution of surpluses in the control group remains a larger
set J = {(w′,V′) : SW (w′,V′) ≥ 0∧SF (w′,V′) ≥ 0}. After REBP was abolished, the former treatment
group’s post-REBP surplus distribution fZ(.) is now again truncated, but specifically with regards to
worker rather than joint surplus:
f1(w,V) =
 0 if (w,V) 6∈ (J \M
NC)⇔ SW (w,V) < εWb ∨ SF (w,V) < 0
f0(w,V)
1−∫
(w,V)∈MNC f
0(w,V)d(w,V)
if (w,V) ∈ (J \MNC)⇔ SW (w,V) ≥ εWb ∧ SF (w,V) ≥ 0
.
(14)
This truncation arises during REBP because jobs initially viable in 1988 are placed into quit or layoff
(or both) territory during REBP, where again fZpre(.) denotes the pre-REBP initial surplus distribution:
δZ =
∫
(w,V)
∫
(w′,V′)
1
(
S˜W (w′,V′) < Z × εWb︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quit
Mutual Sep.: ∧︷︸︸︷∨ S˜F (w′,V′) < 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Layoff
)
k((w′,V′)|(w,V))fZpre(w,V)d(w′,V′)d(w,V).
(15)
Post-abolition of REBP, we can replace the densitities in the treatment group with the truncated
distribution (15), and derive separation rates. We present the simplified expression setting idiosyncratic
shocks to zero in the very short run (e.g., one year):
∆1 =
1
1− ∫(w,V)∈MNC f0(V)d(w,V)
∫
(w,V)\MNC
1
(
S˜W (w,V) < εW
′ ∨ S˜F (w,V) < εF ′
)
f0(w,V)d(w,V).
(16)
As a result, the initial incidence of a given surplus shocks – on the firm or worker side – matters, unlike
in the Coasean setting where joint surplus and hence the net effect of shocks on that allocative concept
matter. Figure 8 Panels (b) and (c) illustrates this implication by plotting the relationship between
separations in the former treatment and control groups, and the surplus shock after REBP abolition.
For worker shocks, the line is flat up until the point hits the truncation point of surplus, and then
increases somewhat more steeply. For firm shocks however, the separation rates are very similar, as
depicted in the case study Figure 9 Panels (b.NC) and (c.NC).
In fact, we can derive the non-Coasean version of the predicted Coasean post-REBP separations
(13):
∆1 =
1
1− ∫(w,V)∈MNC f0(V)d(w,V) ×
[
∆0 −
∫
(w,V)∈MNC
1(S˜(w,V) < εW
′
+ εF
′
)f0(w,V)d(w,V)
]
.
(17)
And similarly to the Coasean case, we can rewrite expression (17) in an empirically tractable form of
21
realized control group separation rates, before and after REBP – but only if most (all) post-REBP
separations arise from worker shocks. In this case, the formerly treated group again exhibits resilience
in form of a kinked comovement between treatment and control separations even in the non-Coasean
setting:
⇒ ∆1 = max
{
0,
1
1− (δ1 − δ0)
[
∆0 − (δ1 − δ0)]} . (18)
Figure 8 Panels (d) plots Equation 18, post-REBP treatment group against control group separations
for this case.
By contrast, if post-REBP shocks are largely due to firm shocks, then the non-Coasean model
can rationalize very similar separation sensitivities between the treatment and control group REBP
survivors – despite the large separations previously induced by REBP:
⇒ ∆1NonCoasean ≈ ∆0. (19)
This situation can arise for two reasons, following the intuitions of Figure 9 Panels (b.NC) and (c.NC).
Either worker shocks are just few and small. Or even the control group has few low-worker-surplus jobs
(yet REBP was a large worker surplus shock). The non-Coasean setting can then rationalize our find-
ings of no post-REBP resilience whatsoever (which rejects the Coasean view). Below in Section 5.5 we
discuss this particular non-Coasean constellation, specifically high worker surplus and low firm surplus,
with limited correlation between the two, by which the non-Coasean setting rationalizes the empirical
findings. We also discuss the concrete real-world sources potentially generating these conditions.
Empirical Evaluation: Reduced-Form Estimation of the Share of Coasean Separations
in a “Mixed Model” Neither framework will fully describe empirical labor markets. To gauge the
quantitative power of each view, we present a “mixed model” that permits us to ask which share of jobs
(separations) are consistent with Coasean protocols. Let share κ of jobs be Coasean (or non-Coasean
with worker shocks driving separations), and share 1− κ follow the specific non-Coasean setting that
we can distinguish (where separations are largely driven by firm shocks due to rigid wages, such that
they ultimately follow largely the control group separation, due to high average worker and low firm
surplus and perhaps wage rigidity). This “mixed” setting implies:
∆1κ = κ∆
1
Coasean + (1− κ)∆1NonCoasean, (20)
which if shocks are largely driven by firm shocks, our particular non-Coasean model can approximate
as a mixture of the Coasean and non-Coasean (firm shock):
≈ αCoasean∆1Coasean + αNon-Coasean∆0 + ε. (21)
where, informally, αCoasean now captures the degree to which the data aligns with the benchmark
Coasean model for any shocks and additionally with the share of separations that are due to worker
surplus shocks. By contrast, αNon-Coasean now captures the separations due to firm shocks in the non-
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Coasean environment. Hence the estimated αCoasean would be an upper bound for κ, since we cannot
directly observe the incidence of shocks driving the separations.  captures errors related to, e.g.,
group-specific shocks.
In this section, we provide a direct measure of κ by estimating model (21) at the birth-year cohort
level, comparing post-REBP separations by cohort between REBP and non-REBP region (i.e. we
collapse the data to the cohort and region level). That is, we revisit the visually striking patterns in
Figures 4 and 5, which plotted these cohort separation gradients. Table 4 reports the estimates for
various horizons after REBP. For the short run, 1995, the estimates imply an essential unit weight on
the non-Coasean model as αNon-Coasean = 1.01 and an (insignificantly) negative weight on the Coasean
model αCoasean = −0.032. In later years, when the power of our prediction decreases, the weight
αCoasean becomes more negative and even statistically significant. That is, the Coasean model seems
to have no additional predictive ability.
In the next Section, 5.4, we present a structural estimation of our model to estimate κ, the share
of Coasean job separations, by estimating Equation (21) with variation at the industry-by-occupation
level and accounting for the nonlinear nature of the specification (due to the max operator in equation
(13)). Subsequently, in Section 5.5, we discuss the assumptions underlying the non-Coasean framework
and its mapping into labor market features in the data.
5.4 Structural Estimation of the Model: Which Share of REBP Separations was
Coasean?
Building on the model, we now present the formal econometric specification estimating the share of
jobs that appears consistent with the fully Coasean benchmark. Specifically, we estimate the fraction
κ of jobs destroyed by the REBP program whose separation behavior was consistent with the Coasean
prediction. Our estimation strategy takes the structure of the economic model in equation (21), along
with (13) and (18), and analyzes variation across industry-occupation cells in the post-abolition period
separation behavior of surviving jobs. The estimation reveals point estimates κˆ that are close to zero
or even negative. Even in our most conservative specification, the upper limit of the 95% confidence
interval for κ is 0.127, indicating that fewer than 13% of separations were efficient. With small shares
of efficient separations, the estimation of the structural model thus delivers parameters estimates that
directly mirror the reduced-form evidence in Section 4, which – at odds with the Coasean framework
– had shown that post-abolition behavior did not differ between treated and untreated matches.
For our analysis, we focus on post-REBP separation rates of the former treatment group, ∆Z=1i
at the industry-by-occupation cell level i. Our methodology could be easily applied to other cell
categorizations. κ again denotes the share of jobs dissolved by the REBP according to the Coasean
protocol (again a lower bound, as it may also capture worker-shock-related separations in the non-
Coasean setting, as explained in the previous section). Our economic model predicts the following
separation rates in among the treated cohorts Z = 1 in the posts-REBP period for a given set of latent
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post-REBP firm or worker shocks (εWi , ε
F
i ):
∆1i = (1− κ)×∆0i (εWi , εFi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Coasean,
Firm Shocks
+κ×max
{
0,
Ni + Ci
Ni
∆0i (ε
W
i , ε
F
i )−
Ci
Ni
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coasean, Any Shocks
Non-Coasean, Worker Shocks
, (22)
Ci and Ni denote the estimated share of compliers and never-separators to the REBP reform at the
industry-occupation cell level, which we calculate by running the difference-in-differences specification
in (1) within each industry-occupation cell. These terms are the analogues of predicted separations in
equations (13) and (18) in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks (“always-separators”).31
Using the notation in Schennach (2012), we let Yi = ∆
1
i denote the observed dependent variable
and X∗i = ∆
0
i (ε
W
i , ε
F
i ) denote the separations arising from the (unobserved) surplus distribution and
shocks. The empirical estimating equation that identifies the main parameter of interest κ can be
written as:
Yi = (1− κ)X∗i + κmax
(
0,
Ni + Ci
Ni
X∗i −
Ci
Ni
)
+ ∆Yi (23)
= g(κ,Ni, Ci, X
∗
i ) + ∆Yi, (24)
where g() is a known function that is nonlinear in X∗i , κ ∈ is the main parameter of interest, and Ni and
Ci are incidental parameters. Estimation of κ can be set up from the regression equation relationship
E[∆Yi|X∗i ] = 0.
To proxy for X∗i , we use separation rates among younger cohorts in the REBP region in the same
industry-occupation cell who were not treated by the program and who thus still contain marginal
jobs but who are exposed to similar industry-level surplus shocks. Concretely, we use separation rates
among workers in the REBP region born between 1943 and 1948.
Reduced-Form Evidence on Inter-Cohort Comovement of Separation Rates Before provid-
ing results of the structural estimation, we first plot the reduced-form relationship between Yi and X
∗
i
in Figure 10. The figure shows the relationship between separation rates at the industry-by-occupation
cell level in formerly treated cohorts (born between 1938 and 1943) against separations rates in slightly
younger cohorts (born between 1943 and 1948). The relationship is strong, positive, and appears linear.
As a benchmark, we also plot as outcome variable the separation rate in even younger cohorts (born
between 1948 and 1953). These have a lower level, as one would expect if surplus is on average higher,
but the relationship is just as strong and positive, thus providing evidence that different cohorts within
an industry-by-occupation cell are affected by similar shocks to surplus. As Figure 10 reveals, there is
no apparent difference between the separation behavior of formerly treated cohorts and their slightly
younger peers as the relationship is almost identical (beyond a level shift) compared to the relationship
between separation rates of the two younger cohorts of workers.
31To see this, note that the multiplication factor 1
1−(δ1−δ0) =
N+C
N
⇔ δ1 − δ0 = CN+C .
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Results of Estimation Table 5 reports estimates of κ based on estimation of equation 22 with non-
linear least squares. Across specifications, we find estimates of κ that are close to zero or even negative.
Our largest point estimate is 0.033 with variation at the four-digit level and considering post-abolition
separations by 1995. Even the most conservative 95% confidence interval rules out κˆ ≥ 0.127. Stated
alternatively, fewer than 13% of separations induced by the REBP were efficient. The table further
reveals more negative estimates at longer horizons, e.g., with the confidence intervals excluding zero
when considering separations by 1998. Arguably, the assumption of absence of idiosyncratic shocks /
absence of convergence is less likely to be fulfilled at longer horizons leading to model misspecification.
However, even at the shortest horizon, considering separations by 1995 as outcome variable, we find
that fewer than 13% of REBP-induced separations had been efficient.32
A General Method to Detect “Harvesting Effects” In principle our econometric method can
be used for any setting in which a researcher wishes to test for and quantify “harvesting effects”,
or positive selection at the exit margin (see Section 5.5, “5th Ingredient”). The first requirement is
quasi-experimental and transitory shocks in the payoff function that induce exit from a distribution
(in our case: job separations) in the treatment group, but did not hit the control group. Second, the
research requires panel data to track survivors of that shock and their peers in the control group, after
the transitory payoff shifter is switched off again (in our case: the reform abolition).
5.5 Discussion: Mapping the Non-Coasean Framework to Concrete Labor Market
Features
Below we discuss the five model ingredients featured in the non-Coasean framework that can rationalize
our findings. Since there is a menu of potential frictional candidates generating these properties and
hence explaining the rejection of the Coasesan hypothesis, we map these theoretical ingredients into
plausible real-world labor market features.
1st Ingredient: High Worker Surplus and Low Firm Surplus The high initial worker surplus
ensured that REBP – a massive policy shift – managed to extract some marginal matches that oth-
erwise (as in the control group) would have remained inframarginal.33 Hence, the selection by worker
surplus did not generate post-REBP resilience – allowing the non-Coasean model to break the iron
link between selective separations and subsequent resilience (“harvesting effects”) that would be the
strong prediction of core features of the Coasean setting – if most post-REBP separations are driven
by firm surplus shifts. Indeed, our sample consists of male, older, and high-tenured workers, that exact
constellation turns out to be predicted by the long-standing hypotheses of implicit contract models, in
form of backloading of compensation over the job spell (Lazear (1979, 1981)): in a period-by-period
consideration, young workers are “underpaid”, while older workers are “overpaid”. This backloading
32We have also explored strategies to account for to measurement error using methodology for nonlinear models devel-
oped in Li and Vuong (1998), Li (2002) and Schennach (2004), surveyed in Schennach (2012).
33Alternatively, small worker shocks rather than high baseline worker surplus would help explain why worker surplus
is not a driver of most separations. The distinction between the two models would remain robust to this view.
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is supported by implicit contracts or formal institutions.34 Moreover, the types of the incremental
REBP separations were into permanent nonemployment, evidently by workers unlikely to find or seek
reemployment (Section 3, Table 2, Columns (4) and (6)). Consistent with that view, Section 4 revealed
that a series of labor demand shocks indeed did not trigger differential firing for the REBP cohorts.
On the institutional side, the Austrian setting features an explicit role for works councils that are
consulted in the separation process, providing formal and informal support for such implicit contracts
and the selectivity of layoffs (Bewley, 2002). Moreover, Austria mandates multiple months of severance
payments in the case of layoffs that are foregone for quitters, providing little incentive for workers to
quit unilaterally (despite full UI eligibility for quitters in Austria, as discussed in Section 2).35
2nd Ingredient: Large Worker Surplus Shift From REBP If worker surplus is high on average
(to have firm shocks drive separations), then how did REBP extract so many workers through the
worker surplus channel? The second ingredient is the exceptional size of the initial UI treatment –
four years of full UI eligibility, hence serving as a bridge into early retirement – likely played a role. In
Appendix Section A, we benchmark that, for the average worker, the cash value corresponds to 71%
of annual earnings. In the treatment group, the initial outside option boost was therefore sufficiently
large to sweep up even some workers that would otherwise remain inframarginal to the typical worker-
side shocks. Finally, a cross-validation test is that smaller shifts in UI should not induce workers to
separate. Indeed, in Ja¨ger et al. (2018), where we document that wages are insulated from UI shifts,
we find that smaller shifts in the benefit level (but lower benefit duration) did not entail separation
effects even among older workers and even during the 1980s in Austria.
3rd Ingredient: Limited Correlation Between Initial Firm and Worker Surpluses In the
non-Coasean setting, the low-worker surplus jobs REBP extracted need not have been marginal with
respect to firm surplus, for example, if the unilateral surpluses are independently distributed. There are
various ways to limit the correlation between the worker and firm surpluses. First, the firm and worker
fundamentals VF and VW may be uncorrelated. Second, the wage setting process may exactly generate
uncorrelated surplus, in form of wage compression, i.e. cross-sectional wage rigidity.36 By contrast, in
the Coasean setting, the correlation between initial worker and firm surpluses is irrelevant because of
rebargaining whenever at a given wage bargain one party’s unilateral surplus were to cross zero into
negative territory, provided the match maintains positive joint surplus. While absence of resilience
is therefore sufficient to reject the Coasean view of job separations in our context, the non-Coasean
setting could even rationalize “anti-resilience”, i.e. higher sensitivity among the REBP survivors to
subsequent shocks. This could emerge under a “random” wage (not related to fundamentals) that
can generate negative correlation between worker and firm surplus: REBP quitters would then be
very underpaid – and hence particularly valuable to firms, and REBP would have removed low worker
surplus jobs but also high firm surplus jobs. In this thought experiment, the non-Coasean model with
such particular features could even rationalize higher separations among the former treatment group
34While models of job ladders and negotiation capital such as Cahuc et al. (2006) generate this joint distribution, these
models feature bilaterally efficient (re-)bargaining and separations.
35In this world, baseline quits may also reflect large inframarginal shifts (e.g., health shocks).
36In Ja¨ger et al. (2018), we document evidence that wages are rigid to shifts in worker’s outside option.
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in response to firm shocks.37
4th Ingredient: Persistence in Surplus Differences (Limited Reshuﬄing by Idiosyncratic
Shocks) An extreme version of an alternative mechanism may mask Coasean separations, by virtue of
idiosyncratic shocks: if the model featured no persistence in worker and firm surplus factors whatsoever,
such that the idiosyncratic Markov process reshuﬄes the position of jobs into the same, stationary
surplus distribution in each period, the economy would not feature a truncated distribution when
REBP is abolished, and would be observationally equivalent to a non-Coasean setting.
We believe that the immediate-convergence assumption is unlikely to explain our full set of results.
First and most obviously, it would require full convergence already at the one-year horizon. Second, in
Section 4, we conduct a complier analysis and in fact trace out some persistent observable attributes
associated with the incremental REBP separators that distinguish them from their non-separating
peers. Third, in Appendix Figure A.3, already discussed in Section 3, we plot the dynamics, year by
year, of the additional separations due to REBP: when workers age into eligibility, or at the onset of
REBP for the older workers who were born before 1938 and therefore become immediately eligible, there
is a pronounced one-time spike in separations. This spike provides ancillary evidence for some degree
of persistence and hence against the quick-convergence view, revealing a “pent-up” mass of marginal
matches that separate when outside options increase, rather than a persistent elevation in the annual
separation rate (implied by cross-sectional surplus distributions to be reshuﬄed each period). Fourth,
the reform was large such that the idiosyncratic shocks would need to be accordingly large to replenish
the mass of marginal matches: REBP increased separations by about 28%; and as discussed above,
REBP amounted to around 71% of the average worker’s annual salary. Fifth, our sample contains
older workers with high labor force attachment, whose baseline turnover is typically lower, suggesting
that the amount of separation-relevant idiosyncratic shocks is, if anything, selected towards a stable
and persistent surplus group.
5th Ingredient: Limited ‘Scarring” Effects From REBP The demography literature distin-
guishes harvesting and scarring effects: harvesting effects imply that transitory negative shocks (e.g.,
heat waves) induce low-health workers into exit and thereby reduce the subsequent average mortality
rate of the survivors. Scarring effects describe situations in which the original shock may permanently
lower the cohorts’ health going forward, limiting or even masking potential harvesting effects. Our
double difference-in-difference design, specifically our slightly younger control cohorts in the REBP
regions, helps rule out this explanation for our absence of harvesting effects. For example, if REBP
(or shocks correlated with REBP) had lowered firm investment, labor demand, stigma, or otherwise
have changed social norms, we would expect to see most of these to show up negatively among the
slightly younger workers (presumably close substitutes and in the same labor market) within in the
REBP region – whom our design’s second difference-in-difference layer compares to the young in the
37Some of our evidence may suggest such short-run “anti-resilience”. Appendix Figure A.4 documents additional
separations in the formerly treated group between 1993q3 to 1994q1 for the bottom quintile of industry growth cells.
Figure 7 documents slightly more sensitive slopes in the “hockey stick” for formerly treated cohorts. However, any such
short run “phantom treatment effects” may arise from the institutional fact of grandfathering in of pre-scheduled layoffs
due to advance notifications as required by law, of multiple months, as we discuss in the previous section.
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non-REBP regions.38
6 Worker Survey and Complier Analysis: Who Separated Due to
REBP, How, and From Which Jobs?
To complement our model-driven test that sorted workers by the economic concept of job surplus, we
provide evidence on classifications of REBP separations into subjective categories reported by workers
themselves. Second, we extend the method of complier analysis to difference-in-differences settings
such as our setting, to shed direct light on the pre-separation attributes of the REBP separators.
6.1 Classifying REBP Separations: Survey and Administrative Data
We now study micro-level survey data and an administrative measure to study the nature of the sep-
arations induced by the outside option shift. We find that workers largely perceived these separations
to be amicable quits and early retirement.
Survey: Micro Census The Austrian Micro Census is the largest continuous survey of the Austrian
population. It contains information on the reasons for the ends of nonemployed worker’s last job,
starting in 1995. For jobs that ended within the last eight years, respondents also report the reason
for the separation:
1. a one-sided or amicable quit,
2. a layoff due to establishment closure,
3. a layoff due to economic reasons,
4. a layoff due to other reasons,
5. early retirement, incl. limited employability and health,39
6. regular retirement, or
7. other reasons (incl. expiration of fixed term contracts, civil service, and a residual, unclassified
category).
As a basis for this analysis, we replicate the REBP treatment effect on separations in that the micro
census sample, described in Appendix Section B.
38Wage effects of the workers’ outside option boost could, in combination with wage rigidity, perhaps lead to subse-
quently higher separations than would be warranted under the Coasean view, but this route already departs from the
Coasean view. We cannot credibly study wage effects in the present context given the attrition (separation effects). Yet in
Ja¨ger et al. (2018), we document that in Austria, wages of stayers are insensitive to UI-induced boosts in workers’ outside
option, even for older workers such as our sample here, and during the 1980s. We also do not focus on potential labor
market spillovers through replacement hiring (Ja¨ger, 2016; Mercan and Schoefer, 2018) or through search externalities
(Lalive et al., 2011).
39The questionnaire and survey manual clarify that “early retirement” is supposed to encompass these additional
categories.
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Composition Shifts in Separation Types We focus on the sample of respondents whose job
ended when they were between 50 and 54 years old. We estimate a difference-in-differences model with
cohort and region effects from Equation (1), with indicator variables for last job ending between the
ages of 50 and 54 in a respective separation type.
Figure 11(a) plots the difference-in-difference treatment effects of the REBP program on these
seven types of separation indicators and documents that the largest categories of separation types are
classified as early retirement and retirement for other reasons as well as quits, including amicable quits.
Specifically, we find a statistically significant, positive effect of the REBP program on quits among
older workers of about 0.7 ppt and effects of about 1.5 ppt for both early retirement and retirement
for other reasons. Figure 11(a) also provides some evidence for a small and positive effect on layoffs
due to economic reasons with an effect size of about 0.5 ppt, about a tenth of the overall increase in
separations. The effects on layoffs due to closure or for other reasons are much smaller, and statistically
not significant. In a next step, we dissect the reasons for the additional quits into (i) personal or family
circumstances, (ii) sickness or disability, or (iii) other reasons (Figure 11(b)). Strikingly, almost half
were due to sickness or disability.
Measuring Unilateral Quits in Administrative Data Next, we exploit an administrative wait-
ing period for UI eligibility for quitters that we can trace in the administrative data. Specifically,
worker-initiated quits come with a 28-day waiting period between registration with the government
employment agency and eligibility for UI receipt, both of which our administrative data provides with
daily accuracy. Hence we classify a separation as a worker-initiated quit if the delay in UI receipt is at
least 28 days.40 In Figure 11(c), we sort quits between ages 50 and 55 by month of birth and region
akin to Figure 2(c) and to the validation exercise using the Microcensus in Appendix Section B. We
confirm the observed increase in quits using our DiD strategy in column 7 of Table 2 and Appendix
Table A.2, where we document a 2.1- or 2.3-ppt effect on the share of workers who take up unemploy-
ment benefits after a longer-than-28-day waiting period. Quits therefore accounted for about 20% of
the overall increase in separations. This result does not mean that the remaining 80% of separations
were layoffs but likely reflect mutually agreed-upon separations, as Austria does not feature experience
rating.
6.2 Complier Characterization of the REBP Separators
We next dissect the characteristics of REBP separators. Our conceptual framework would predict
that these jobs should have carried low initial worker surplus (but not necessarily different firm sur-
plus). In this section, we examine characteristics of REBP separators and also assess whether REBP
had particularly large separation effects among groups with proxies for that surplus constellation.41
40This is a lower bound on the share of quitters, since there could be quitters who become re-employed in less than 28
days or decide never to receive UI (false negatives). We are not concerned about non-quitters delaying UI take-up (false
positives), because workers have a strong incentive to register immediately with the employment agency to avoid losing
health insurance coverage. Importantly, this incentive extends to the quitters not yet eligible for actual UI benefits. In
Ja¨ger et al. (2018), we find that most separators register with the employment agency within little more than a month of
the end of an employment spell.
41Our simple conceptual framework posits that the surplus shift due to the treatment was homogeneous and triggered
differential separation behavior because of dispersion in the initial worker surplus. An alternative interpretation of the
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All characteristics we consider are measured before the start of the REBP program in 1988 and by
construction unaffected by the reform.
These jobs are compliers: they would have survived in the absence of the treatment (hence still
present in the control group) but did not survive when exposed to it (treatment group). We therefore
extend the complier analysis method (Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Abadie, 2003) to difference-in-difference
settings such as ours.
Our complier analysis reveals that marginal jobs indeed exhibited some observables consistent with
low surplus: marginal jobs originate from blue-collar occupations in industries with a high incidence of
sickness and disability among older workers. Compared to surviving jobs, marginal jobs had a higher
risk of long unemployment duration and were more prevalent in shrinking industries and firms. They
also had similar wages to their peers, potentially in line with our non-Coasean candidate that appeals
to wage compression and wage rigidity.
But the analysis also reveals that the REBP separators stemmed from many pockets of the Aus-
trian labor market and would therefore not be definitely identified off their pre-separation attributes.
Moreover, our discussion below highlights how each given attribute may carry multiple potential in-
terpretations, and hence illustrates the difficulty to trace surplus concepts on the basis of observables
– a limitation that necessitated our sharp and robust test in the previous sections in the first place.
Intuition of Complier Analysis We provide the basic intuitions of complier analysis (Imbens and
Rubin, 1997; Abadie, 2003) before moving to our difference-in-differences strategy. We would like to
distill information about the attributes carried by marginal jobs M , for example the mean x¯ of some
scalar variable x (but the methodology can be applied to non-parametrically back out any moment
of the distribution).42 Empirically, we observe the attributes as well as amount of treatment-group
separators and control-group separators. On their own, treatment and control separators convey largely
inframarginal surplus ranges, of surplus at least or at most 0. Yet, we can back out the attributes of
marginal matches (those with close to 0 surplus and hence swept up by REBP) by rearranging the
expression for treatment separators, which are the union of control separators and marginal matches,
such that xZ=1 is just the average of x¯Z=0 and x¯M , weighted by their share in total separations:
x¯Z=1 =
δ
Z=0
δ
Z=1
× x¯Z=0 + δ
Z=1 − δZ=0
δ
Z=1
× x¯M , (25)
⇔ x¯M = δ
Z=1
δ
Z=1 − δZ=0
× x¯Z=1 − δ
Z=0
δ
Z=1 − δZ=0
× x¯Z=0 (26)
The weights are measured as group-level separation rates, along with treatment effect δ
Z=1 − δZ=0.
Below we extend complier analysis to difference-in-difference settings such as ours; to our knowledge,
the formal derivation is new.
heterogeneity is that the surplus shifts the treatment entailed had some heterogeneous sizes as well.
42Specifically, the density of nearly marginal matches carrying x, backed out from treatment and control separators, is:
sM (x) = δ¯
Z=1
δ¯Z=1−δ¯Z=0 × s(x)Z=1 − δ¯
Z=0
δ¯Z=1−δ¯Z=0 × s(x)Z=0. Alternatively, s(x) is the product of the relative treatment effect
on separations among type-x jobs compared to the average effect, times the share of type-x job in the initial sample,
f(x): sM (x) = δ
Z=1(x)−δZ=0(x)∫
x[δZ=1(x)−δZ=0(x)]dF (x)
· f(x).
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6.2.1 Methodology: Complier Analysis in Difference-in-Differences Settings
We formally characterize sufficient conditions for complier analysis (Abadie, 2003) in difference-in-
differences contexts and summarize the framework, building on an additive separability assumption
for attributes.43
Identification of Marginal Matches We set up a potential outcomes framework to describe the
assumptions under which the estimated coefficient νˆ from the difference-in-differences model (1) identi-
fies the mass of marginal matches in the model from the discrete choice problem from Section 5. There,
we estimated the effect of the REBP programs on separations in a difference-in-differences specification
on the population of workers holding a job in 1988 before the onset of the reform with fixed effects for
region r and cohort c.
Notation and Definitions A binary variable Z captures whether workers are eligible for the REBP
benefit extension:
Z =
0 ineligible for unemployment insurance extension1 eligible for unemployment insurance extension.
Interpreted through the lens of the discrete choice problem, Z shifts a component of the worker’s
outside option b+ Z ·∆b.
D ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a given worker separates from their initial, pre-reform job by the end
of the reform period (whether she was treated or not). We let D0 and D1 denote the potential values
that D takes for Z = 0 and Z = 1, respectively (D = ZD1 + (1 − Z)D0). That is, each worker is
characterized by (D0 = 0, D1 = 1) with regards to his potential outcomes that would emerge for either
treatment status Z ∈ {0, 1}:
DZ =
0 no separation1 separation
Economically, a separation reveals that the job’s surplus fell beneath the threshold and rendered the
match non-viable.
The outside option shift varied by region r ∈ {r0, r1} and cohort c ∈ {c1, c0}. We define r0 to be
the control region and r1 to be the REBP region. Analogously, we define c0 to be ineligible cohorts and
c1 to be eligible cohorts. We thus have that Z = 1 for (r1, c1) only, and Z = 0 for other combinations
(r1, c0), (r0, c0) and (r0, c0).
Partitioning the Set of Pre-Reform Matches We characterize pre-reform attributes x of com-
pliers, never-separators and always-separators. Compliers denote workers that separate when exposed
to the REBP program but who would not have separated from their job otherwise. Never-separators
43Our additive separability assumption for attributes mirrors analogous assumptions for parallel trends in potential out-
comes in recent work extending the instrumental variables setup to difference-in-differences settings (De Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille (forthcoming), Hudson et al. (2017)). In Appendix C.1, we provide a detailed, stand-alone methodological
guide.
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are workers in matches that survive regardless of whether they are exposed to the REBP program while
always-separators are workers in those matches that dissolve even in the absence of REBP. Formally,
we define the following three groups:
AS: Always-Separators have potential outcomes (D0 = 1, D1 = 1) and share pi
AS .
NS: Never-Separators have potential outcomes (D0 = 1, D1 = 1) and share pi
NS .
C: Compliers – Marginal Jobs – have potential outcomes (D0 = 0, D1 = 1) and share pi
C .
Assumptions for Identification of Complier Characteristics in Difference-in-Differences
Settings We make the following four assumptions to estimate the treatment effect in the difference-in-
differences strategy. The assumptions are mostly common ones in an instrumental variables setup. For
extending complier analysis to difference-in-differences settings, we additionally make an independence
assumption for characteristics and assume additive separability for attributes.
A.1: First Stage For all r ∈ (r0, r1) and c ∈ (c0, c1), P (D1 = 1|r, c) > P (D0 = 1|r, c).
Intuitively, Assumption 1 implies that more separations take place under the reform, as documented
in the previous section, and ensures the existence of compliers.
A.2: Monotonicity D1 −D0 ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 rules out defiers, i.e. individuals that would separate if benefits are not extended but
would not separate if unemployment benefits are more generous.
A.3: Independence (D0, D1, x) ⊥ Z|(r, c).
The independence assumption posits that conditional on r and c, the instrument Z is orthogonal
to potential outcomes D0, and D1 and, extending the usual assumptions in instrumental variables
settings, also to attributes x.
A.4: Additive Separability For all d, d′ ∈ {0, 1},
P (D0 = d,D1 = d
′|c1, r) − P (D0 = d,D1 = d′|c0, r) and E[x|c1, r,D0 = d,D1 = d′] −
E[x|c0, r,D0 = d,D1 = d′] do not depend on r.
The additive separability assumption for characteristics x is analogous to assumptions for parallel
trends or additive separability in recent work extending the instrumental variables setup to difference-
in-differences settings (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (forthcoming), Hudson et al. (2017)). A
testable implication of Assumption 4 that we bring to the data is that E[x|c1, r]−E[x|c0, r] does not
depend on r. This is equivalent to saying that the between-cohort differences in the job attribute
distribution are the same across regions, specifically among marginal jobs.
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Identification and Estimation of Mass of Marginal Matches (Compliers) ν Under the
independence and additive separability assumption, we can express the conditional probabilities of
each type as follows:
piArc = P (D0 = 1, D1 = 1|r1, c1) = P (D0 = 1|r1, c1)
= P (D0 = 1|r1, c0) + P (D0 = 1|r0, c1)− P (D0 = 1|r0, c0) (27)
= E(D|Z = 0, r1, c0) + E(D|Z = 0, r0, c1)− E(D|Z = 0, r0, c0),
piNrc = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 0|r1, c1) = P (D1 = 0|r1, c1)
= P (D = 0|Z = 1, r1, c1) (28)
= 1− E(D|Z = 1, r1, c1),
piCrc = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 1|r1, c1) = 1− piArc − piNrc, (29)
where piArc denotes the share of always-separators, pi
N
rc = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 0|r1, c1) the share of never-
separators, and piCrc the share of compliers. The sample estimators for these shares from regression (1)
are then piArc = β̂+ φ̂r + ψˆc , pi
N
rc = 1− β̂− φ̂r− ψ̂c− ν̂, and piCrc = 1−piNrc−piArc = νˆ. That is, ν̂ identifies
the size of the set of marginal matches. It is our empirical estimate of the mass of marginal matches,
estimated in regression model as ν in Equation (1).
Identification and Estimation of Complier Means Under the first stage and monotonicity
assumptions above, we can express the characteristics of compliers, E[x|r1, c1, D1 = 1, D0 = 0], in
terms of estimable quantities:
E[x|r1, c1, D1 = 1, D0 = 0] = pi
C
rc+pi
A
rc
piCrc
·E[x|r1, c1, D1 = 1]− pi
A
rc
piCrc
E[x|r1, c1, D0 = 1]. (30)
Appendix C.1 documents the proof building on arguments in Abadie (2003).
Complier characteristics are thus identified in a difference-in-difference IV setting as we can con-
struct sample analogues to each of the terms on the right-hand side as follows. By independence, we
have that:
E[x|r1, c1, D1 = 1] = E[x|r1, c1, D = 1, Z = 1]. (31)
By independence and additive separability in x, we have:
E[x|r1, c1, D0 = 1] =E[x|r1, c0, D0 = 1] + (E[x|r0, c1, D0 = 1]−E[x|r0, c0, D0 = 1])
=E[x|r1, c0, D = 1, Z = 0] + (E[x|r0, c1, D = 1, Z = 0]−E[x|r0, c0, D = 1, Z = 0]).
(32)
Sample analogues exist for each of the right-hand side terms in 31 and 32:
E[x|r, c,D = 1, Z = 0] = 1
Nr,c
∑
i∈(r,c)
xiDi , (33)
where Nr,c is the number of observations in the given (r, c) cell.
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Thus, under the assumptions above, our framework allows us to directly estimate any complier char-
acteristic x (including the full distribution) in a difference-in-differences IV setup. In Appendix C.1,
we also present an equivalent one-step regression estimation of complier attributes in difference-in-
differences settings. For inference, we use the non-parametric bootstrap to arrive at a sampling distri-
bution of (30).
6.2.2 Results
At a broad level, our results suggest that marginal jobs are characterized by low and declining surplus.
In particular, we find that, compared to jobs surviving the treatment, compliers are primarily blue-
collar workers in declining establishments from manual labor-intensive industries with higher shares
of disability or sickness among older workers. Remarkably, we find no evidence for wage differences
between compliers and never-separators – perhaps consistent with wage compression or wage rigidity.
That is, the results could be consistent with low joint surplus but also with lower worker surplus,
compared to never-separators. While the complier characteristics overall point to lower surplus mark-
ers, the analysis is not as clear-cut an adjudication between Coasean and non-Coasean theories of job
separations as our sharp test in Section 5.44
Table 6 provides an overview of means for compliers, never-separators, and always-separators, based
on pre-reform data from 1988, along with p-values for mean differences between compliers and the other
groups.45 We also provide an overview of the differences between compliers and never-separators in
Figure 12 (c), where we normalize the difference by the standard deviation for each variable to facilitate
the comparison across variables. The sample for Table 6 is the same on which we estimate Equation
(1): employed men in May 1988 working in regions where REBP was never in place or was in place
until 1993.
To complement our analysis of complier characteristics, we also present estimates of treatment
effect heterogeneity of the REBP program on separations, largely mirroring the results of the complier
analysis.46 Figure 12(b) and the last column of Table 6 present the estimates along several dimen-
sions. For each covariate, we separately estimate equation (1) while including the interaction effect of
the covariate with REBP treatment. The categories are binary characteristics (e.g., white collar) or
above/below median for continuous values (e.g., earnings).
Appendix D provides a detailed description of each variable we analyze below.
44A case in point is that, in some cases, compliers exhibit lower surplus markers compared to always-separators. What
type of model would rationalize these findings? One explanation are large idiosyncratic shocks such as severe health
shocks, as captured in our model in Section 5 in form of Markov process k(.|.) and as discussed further in Section 5.5.
Such shocks could push into separation very high-surplus jobs compared to compliers (REBP separators) and may strike
independently of the initial surplus level. As a result, jobs with initially high-surplus markers would be dissolved, to a
degree that always-separators compare favorably to compliers.
45We focus on workers in the cohorts born after 1933 for the complier analysis. We provide a test of an implication of
the additive separability assumption and report results in Table A.1. While we find statistically significant differences for
some variables we consider, the magnitudes of the respective differences are small.
46For Bernoulli-distributed covariates Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2013) show that
the relative likelihood of a complier having a particular Bernoulli-distributed attribute is given by the ratio of the first
stage effect for that group compared to the average first stage. In our setting, this would correspond to the ratio of the
separation effect for that group compared to the average separation effect.
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Blue vs. White Collar Occupations An analysis of the occupational structure of marginal
jobs (for data reasons limited to a classification into blue- and white-collar occupations) reveals that
80% of marginal jobs are in blue-collar occupations while the share of blue-collar workers among both
always- and never-separators are lower at 68% and 53%, respectively. When analyzing treatment effect
heterogeneity, we also find stronger effects of the REBP on separations among blue-collar workers.
We also in unreported results considered the share of marginal jobs across industries and found a
concentration in manual labor-intensive sectors such as mining or manufacturing. Virtually no marginal
jobs exist in high-skilled, white-collar sectors such as health or banking.
Worker Codetermination, Works Councils, and Establishment Size We then investigate
whether compliers are particularly likely to originate from establishments with stronger worker code-
termination through the works council. To do so, we explore the size cutoffs at 5, 20, 100, and 1,000
employees. At each threshold, the codetermination rights of workers are strengthened.47 As described
in Section 2, workers can form a works council starting at establishment with five or more employees.
In establishments with more than 20 employees, employer-works council agreements can be formed
to take older workers’ interests into consideration. In establishments with more than 100 employees,
the local employment agency needs to be notified before sizable layoffs of workers. Finally, the works
council can appeal to an external arbitration committee, e.g., in case of layoffs, when employment
crosses a 200-employee threshold.
Our results show clear differences between compliers and never-separators across establishment
size thresholds. Specifically, marginal jobs are more likely than never-separators to come from very
large establishments where works councils can appeal to external arbitration committees (72.7% vs.
50.8%). This pattern is consistent with stronger codetermination through works councils lending formal
institutional support to implicit contracts as described in Lazear (1979, 1981) and Bewley (2002) and
potentially consistent with our alternative non-Coasean framework described in Section 5.
Employment Growth: Industry and Establishment Level Marginal jobs stem from industries
or establishments with stagnating or declining labor demand. This complier attribute represents indus-
try and establishment employment growth rates in the pre-period from 1982 to 1987.48 The analysis
reveals that marginal jobs stem from declining industries which had a negative growth rate of -1.4ppt
in the pre-period while both always- and never-separators come from moderately growing industries
with positive growth rates of around 0.8 and 2.9ppt in the same time frame. The pattern is more
pronounced at the establishment level, where we find that compliers stem from establishments with
a negative average growth of -16.5ppt while never-separators stem from establishments with positive
growth of 7.7ppt. Relatedly, only 14% of marginal jobs stem from establishments with positive em-
ployment growth in the pre-period while the shares of both always- and never-separators in growing
establishments are substantially higher at 35.5% and 53.4%, respectively. Mirroring the complier char-
acteristics, we also find that employment growth at the industry and establishment level correlates
47Of course, other attributes also vary with establishment size so our analysis of worker codetermination and establish-
ment size does not definitively pin down only variation in codetermination.
48This analysis is therefore restricted to those establishments we observe in the pre-REBP period.
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negatively with the treatment effect on separations, documenting that the REBP led to more separa-
tions when industries or firms were in decline. Overall, the evidence documents robustly that marginal
jobs occurred in sectors and establishments that were declining, consistent with a low or decreasing
joint surplus, worker surplus (lower expected continuation value), or firm surplus (at a given wage). It
is consistent with a narrative in which the REBP program managed to buffer and perhaps accelerate
labor market adjustment to some degree (since the compliers are, by construction, still present in the
peer employers in the control regions and cohorts).
Wages Wages of compliers and never-separators are statistically indistinguishable (EUR 27,800 vs
EUR 28,200, CPI-adjusted to 2003). Similarly, the earnings of compliers and always-separators are
also not distinguishable at the 5% level. Relatedly, we do not find statistically significant treatment
effect heterogeneity by earnings, conditional on the other covariates, in our estimation of treatment
effect heterogeneity.
We further analyze AKM-specifications (Abowd et al., 1999) in the pre-period before 1988 and
find that compliers and never-separators have similar firm and worker effects, with the point evidence
perhaps pointing towards lower worker effects. We estimate the following AKM model:
lnwit = αi + ψJ(i,t) +X
′
itφ+ νit,
where αi and ψJ(i,t) denote worker and establishment fixed effects. Control vector Xit comprises a
third-order polynomial in age. Worker effects αi can be interpreted as the permanent component of
wages workers command irrespective of the particular employer. Establishment effects ψJ(i,t) capture
the wage premium or discount a given employer pays to a worker controlling for the worker effect. The
fixed effects are identified through worker moves across employers, in the largest connected set.49
Our analysis reveals that the point estimates for worker effects are 6.3% smaller among marginal
workers compared to never-separators, although the difference is not statistically significant. The
results are consistent with marginal matches having permanently lower earnings compared to their
peers, although the imprecision of the estimate prohibits a strong interpretation. Marginal jobs and
never-separators have virtually indistinguishable establishment effects, with the point estimate for the
difference being 0.1% smaller among marginal jobs. The treatment effect heterogeneity analysis also
reveals no statistically significant differences in treatment effects between matches with different estab-
lishment or worker effects. One interpretation is that the excess REBP separations stem from matches
with similar firm surplus, since establishment fixed effects have been shown to correlate positively with
measures of value added per worker (see Card et al., 2017). A caveat to this interpretation builds on the
aforementioned compliers’ similarity of raw earnings and negative labor demand proxies (employment
growth).
Tenure The point estimate for tenure of workers in marginal jobs is higher compared to the whole
sample, although the difference is not statistically significant (same for treatment effect heterogeneity).
The complier mean for tenure in 1988 is 12.6 years compared to 11.6 years for never-separators. Tenure
49For estimation, we follow the procedure in Correia et al. (2016).
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is a particularly ambiguous attribute as it may be associated with distinctly negative firm surplus but
positive worker surplus (Lazear, 1979, 1981; Frimmel et al., 2018), but alternatively positive joint
surplus due to ex ante investments (Oi, 1962) or match quality due to selection mechanism (Cahuc
et al., 2006; Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2013; Bagger et al., 2014).
Sickness and Disability Measures of worker sickness and disability are interesting complier at-
tributes because they may capture disutiltiy of labor or lower productivity. Since we analyze a sample
of workers employed at the onset of the reform, we cannot focus on sick leave or disability spells at that
time. Instead, we focus on sick leave and disability rates at the 4-digit industry level in the pre-reform
period. We exploit the ASSD administrative registration of these spells. For both indicators, sick leave
and disability, as well as for the combined rate of the two, we find that compliers come from industries
with higher indicators of morbidity among older workers. For example, compliers’ industries have a
0.8 ppt higher share of workers on sick leave or disability compared to never-separators, about 50% of
a standard deviation.50 Similarly, these industries exhibited stronger treatment effects. Overall, these
results suggest that REBP dissolved matches in which the disutility of working increases or worker
productivity decreases with age, consistent with low and shrinking (worker) surplus.51
Long-Term Unemployment Risk Finally, we consider an indicator for risk of long-term unem-
ployment. We do so by regressing an indicator for experiencing an unemployment spell longer than one
year on a set of predictors among the sample of workers in the pre-reform period from 1982 to 1987.
The pre-separation variables we include for the prediction are fixed effects for 15 large industries, an
indicator for being in a white-collar occupation, the local unemployment rate, and third-degree poly-
nomials of tenure in current job and experience over the last 25 years. We then analyze the predicted
risk of a long-term UI spell as a complier attribute for our sample of pre-REBP 1988 jobs.
Compared to the never-separators, compliers have a 2.6 ppt higher risk of experiencing an unem-
ployment spell longer than one year based on our prediction. The difference is statistically significant.
The point estimates for treatment effect heterogeneity along this dimension point in a similar direction
although are less precisely estimated. Overall, the evidence suggests that the REBP reform selected
those workers who had a higher risk of experiencing long-term unemployment after a separation even
in the absence of the reform. This perspective is consistent with our finding that most of the excess
REBP separators went into long-term nonemployment as documented in Section 3. Moreover, the
workers that separated from their 1988 job in response to REBP evidently were unlikely to find, or
seek, reemployment, consistent with the workers having low surplus with respect to nonemployment,
as in our framework in Section 5.
50These proxies are powerful because for workers younger than 55, a disability spell indicates severe health problems
as disability insurance formally requires medical impairment to reduce the capacity to work by at least 50 percent in any
occupation. The highest incidence of sickness and disability can be found in mining, construction, and manufacturing,
sectors dominated by blue-collar labor, which also showed a high share of marginal jobs.
51A caveat to this interpretation arises from the potential positive selection implied by the fact that our sample considers
workers employed at that age in these industries at the onset of the reform.
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7 Conclusion
When labor market quantities adjust, they largely do so along the employment (extensive) margin
rather than the hours (intensive) margin.52 At the micro level, such extensive-margin adjustments
play out as discrete choice problems within employment relationships of individual workers and firms
that are destroyed, maintained or formed, with a basic condition: each party be better off inside the
job than with her respective outside option, hence enjoying surplus from the job. By this theory, the
distribution of heterogeneous job surpluses determines the level of employment, and its adjustment.53
An open question is which theories of job formation and separation guide these interactions driving
extensive-margin employment adjustment. According to the popular approach that we have labelled
“Coasean”, the parties exploit all gains from trade by using arbitrarily complicated contractual ar-
rangements to transfer utility. This powerful and theoretically tractable modeling approach therefore
appeals to abstract allocative wage and surplus concepts that do not directly map into empirical ana-
logues. On the basis of wage behavior or typical observables among separators, this view is therefore
difficult to definitely distinguish from “non-Coasean” models, in which frictions such as in wage setting
or due to formal or informal institutional constraints, potentially permit inefficient separations that
are costly to the firm and the worker.
Which of these two perspectives provides a better description of real-world job dynamics, naturally
determines the welfare properties of employment adjustment and hence the potential scope for policy
interventions, such as short-term work arrangements (Giupponi and Landais, 2018), unemployment
insurance (Chetty, 2006), minimum wages (Lee and Saez, 2012), payroll taxes (Saez et al. forthcoming),
seniority layoff rules (Sorensen, 2018), retirement policies (Lazear, 1979) and monetary policy (Berger
et al., 2015).
We have presented a sharp empirical test of whether Coasean theories of jobs can account for
empirical separation behavior. We studied a quasi-experimental extension of UI benefits for older
Austrian workers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By the Coasean view, this policy should have
increased workers’ non-employment value, reduced job surplus, and and led to separations of marginal
matches – namely those with low joint job surplus. Indeed, we document large – 11.2ppt (28%) –
separation increases among the treated cohorts, compared to their slightly younger ineligible colleagues
and also compared to their older peers in control regions.
The key prediction distinguishing Coasean job theories, positing efficiency of bargaining and hence
implying efficient separations, was not borne out. Studying survivors of the reform period, we exploited
the transitory nature of the quasi-experiment program to generate two distinct labor markets: one in
which the reform extracted marginal matches, and one with those marginal matches still present. In
stark contradiction to the Coasean prediction – in which a notion of joint job surplus would have isolated
the selected survivors to any kind of subsequent shock –, the formerly treated and thereby potentially
advantageously selected jobs subsequently exhibited exactly the same separation behavior after the
52For business cycle adjustment, see Hansen (1985). For cross-country facts, see Prescott et al. (2009) and Bick et al.
(2014). Mui and Schoefer (2018) study the labor supply side of extensive-margin adjustment with potential rationing.
53See, e.g., Pissarides (2000) for the DMP theory of employment as a function of job surplus arising from recruitment
costs, and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) proposes “fundamental surplus” as the key determinant of the amplitude of
cyclical DMP fluctuations in employment.
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outside options are reduced again. Our structural model estimates that at most 4% (upper confidence
interval: 13%) of job separations in our study conformed to the canonical Coasean conditions.
We present one promising non-Coasean alternative that can coherently rationalize our full set of
findings. At the core, this narrative appeals to wage frictions or other – formal, behavioral or social –
institutional constraints in the spirit of Bewley (2002).54 Such frictions, as would emerge under some
degree of wage rigidity and cross-sectional wage compression, curb the potentially very complicated-
to-implement compensation schemes necessary to transfer utility in the efficient bargaining inherent to
the Coasean setting.55 Putting limits on such bilateral trades detaches worker and firm surplus, and
hence permits inefficient, one-sided separations. The particular joint distribution that can rationalize
the results is high worker surplus and low firm surplus. For our sample of older workers, that exact
constellation turns out to be predicted by the long-standing hypotheses of implicit contract models, in
form of backloading of compensation (Lazear, 1979, 1981): in a period-by-period perspective, young
workers are “underpaid”, while older workers are “overpaid”.56 Besides potential implicit contracts,
the Austrian setting of our study features formal institutional support for these dynamics. Works
councils are required to be consulted in the separation process, and moreover separations are subject
to firing regulations including severance payments. Consistent with the view of low firm surplus and
rents accruing to these older workers, the types of separations induced by the UI program are into
permanent nonemployment, evidently by workers unlikely to find or seek reemployment, many of which
represented quits. Finally, our complier analysis revealed that UI-induced separations stemmed from
a diverse set of jobs, consistent with the challenge that observable attributes of jobs would have made
it hard to assess the underlying allocational concepts of the policy-induced separations.
We conclude that the separation dynamics we studied provided a sharp empirical rejection of Coasean
theories of efficient bargaining and efficient separations. While we focused on a uniquely suited quasi-
experiment arising in the Austrian labor market among workers in their 50s in the early 1990s, the
full rejection in our particular setting implies that much of the results likely carries over to other labor
market contexts. While we have attempted to trace out the potential concrete frictions underlying
our findings, our paper raises, and provides a methodological toolkit to further study, a natural set
of follow-up questions: under which conditions do real-world labor markets approximate the Coasean
benchmark, and hence limit inefficient separations?
54An alternative explanation we discuss but ultimately deem implausible to account for the full extent of the similarity
is that idiosyncratic shocks could in principle lead the two groups to converge within a single year to the same surplus
distribution.
55In Ja¨ger et al. (2018) we have documented that Austrian wages appear unresponsive to UI benefit level shifts (which
did not entail separations). We cannot credibly study wage effects in the present context given the large attrition implied
by the separation effects.
56Models of job ladders and negotiation capital by Cahuc et al. (2006) predict that over time, workers raise their wage
and grasp job surplus. While these models feature bilaterally efficient bargaining and separations, perhaps incorporating
some notion of ex-post wage rigidity could accommodate our results.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
1988 Job Holders Age 50 Job Holders
No REBP REBP No REBP REBP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 37.338 36.840 49.750 49.751
(10.872) (10.625) (0.068) (0.068)
White Collar 0.423 0.354 0.466 0.380
(0.494) (0.478) (0.499) (0.485)
Experience 15.108 15.840 20.796 21.883
(7.658) (7.515) (6.364) (5.728)
Tenure 7.053 7.944 9.301 9.898
(5.730) (5.907) (8.194) (8.292)
Earnings 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 2.8e+04 2.9e+04
(8124.116) (7502.007) ( 1.0e+04) (9328.159)
Ln Earnings 10.055 10.073 10.174 10.204
(0.386) (0.338) (0.433) (0.382)
Local Unemp. Rate 0.026 0.040 0.027 0.042
(0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036)
Local Unemp. Rate (50+) 0.045 0.133 0.047 0.142
(0.043) (0.127) (0.048) (0.135)
Firm Size 386.638 1360.413 369.443 965.193
(994.056) (3537.014) (952.405) (2115.902)
Emp. Growth at Establishment 0.391 0.469 0.283 0.355
(3.202) (5.577) (2.889) (5.382)
Emp. Growth Industry 0.038 0.017 0.045 0.020
(0.081) (0.076) (0.085) (0.080)
1(Growing Establishment) 0.498 0.461 0.336 0.303
(0.500) (0.498) (0.472) (0.460)
Note: The table reports results summary statistics for a sample of workers em-
ployed at the onset of the reform (1988 Q.2) in columns (1) and (2) and for a
sample of workers employed in the quarter before turning 50 in columns (3) and
(4).
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Table 4: Reduced-Form Evidence on Share of Coasean vs. Non-Coasean Separations: Cohort-Region
Cells
1995 1996 1997 1998
αNon-Coasean 1.012 1.098 1.277 1.355
(0.034) (0.041) (0.056) (0.066)
αCoasean -0.032 -0.085 -0.248 -0.299
(0.034) (0.041) (0.056) (0.065)
R2 0.930 0.960 0.971 0.977
Note: The table reports estimates of the coefficients in Equation (21). We regress
the post-REBP separation rate from February 1994 to February of each year among
REBP stayers in the REBP region, by month of birth, on both the separation rate
among stayers in the non-REBP region and the predicted separation rate based on a
Coasean model the REBP period. We weight the observations of the month of birth
by the number of employed workers born in that month and report standard errors
clustered at the administrative region level.
Table 5: Structural Estimation of Share κ of Efficient Separations Induced by REBP: Industry-
Occupation Cells
2-Digit Industry × Occupation Cells 4-Digit Industry × Occupation Cells
1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998
κˆ -0.0464 -0.123 -0.184 -0.302 0.033 -0.0367 -0.074 -0.168
(0.087) (0.077) (0.088) (0.081) 0.046 (0.055) (0.063) (0.064)
95% CI 0.127 0.029 -0.010 -0.141 0.124 0.072 0.050 -0.041
(Upper Limit)
N 109 109 109 109 275 275 275 275
Note: The table reports estimates of κ based on estimation of Equation 22 with non-
linear least squares and allowing for an intercept shift. We collapse the data at the
industry by occupation (blue/white collar) level and weight each observation by the
number of workers in the cell, dropping cells with fewer than ten workers who survived
the REBP program. The outcome variable is the separation rate from February
1994 to February of each year among REBP survivors in the REBP region. The
model includes the corresponding separation rate among younger workers (cohorts
born between 1943 and 1948) as the main regressor along with its transformations
according to Equation 22.
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Figures
Figure 1: The Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP)
(a) Timeline of Potential Benefit Duration During REBP
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Young Control Group: 40-49 (REBP and Non-REBP Region)
Old Control Group: Non-REBP Region 50+
(b) Map of REBP Treatment and Control Regions
Note: Panel (a) shows the timeline of reform changes in potential benefit duration for eligible workers in REBP and
control regions. It shows the maximum length of benefits for individuals aged 50 or older in the highest experience
category (at least 9 years during the past 15 years), which increased from 30 to 209 weeks starting July 1988. Individuals
who have worked less have a lower maximum benefit duration: If they have worked at least 6 years during the past 10
years, they experience an increase from 30 to 39 weeks in August 1989; if they have worked at least 3 years during the
past 5 years, their maximum length of unemployment stays constant at 30 weeks over the whole time period. It also
shows the maximum length of unemployment insurance for individuals aged 40-49 who fall into the highest experience
category: individuals in this category have worked at least 6 years during the past 10 years. In August 1989, maximum
benefit duration increased from 30 to 39 weeks. (The maximum length of unemployment stays constant at 30 weeks for
individuals who have worked at least 3 years during the past 5 years.) Panel (b) depicts a map of Austrian municipalities
showing the REBP regions. REBP was introduced in TR1 and TR2 in 1988. TR2, REBP was in place until the end of
1991. In TR2, REBP was in place until July 31, 1993. Source for map: Inderbitzin et al. (2016), Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Benefit Extensions and Separations
(a) Separations (1988 to 1993)
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(b) Difference (REBP - Control Region)
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(c) Separations (Ages 50 to 55)
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(d) Difference (REBP - Control Region)
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Note: Panel (a) shows the share of workers who separated from their 1988.Q2-employer (right before the reform) by
1993.Q3 (when reform had just ended). Panel (c) shows the share of workers who have separated from their employer
in the quarter before turning 50 by the quarter before turning 55, i.e. the age range where REBP extended benefits for
eligible workers. Both plot rates by month of birth and within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid)
regions. Panels (b) and (d) show the difference between the REBP and the control region by cohort. Cohorts born after
1943 were not covered by the policy as they turned 50 after the program was abolished 1993.
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Figure 3: Benefit Extensions and Employment Outcomes
(a) Quarters Employed (1988 to 1993) (a) Difference (REBP - Control)
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(b) Quarters Unemployed (1988 to 1993) (b) Difference (REBP - Control)
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Note: Panels (a) and (c) show the average number of quarters that the workers are employed and on UI, respectively,
until the quarter after the end of the REBP (1993q3), among those employed in the quarter before the start of the REBP
(1988q2). Both plot rates by month of birth and within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid)
regions. Panels (b) and (d) show the difference between the REBP and the control region by cohort. Cohorts born after
1943 were not covered by the policy as they turned 50 after the program was abolished in 1993.
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Figure 4: Separation Rate of “REBP Survivors” from 1994 Onward
(a) Through 1995
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(b) Through 1996
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(c) Through 1997
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(d) Through 1998
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Note: The figure shows, by month of birth, the share of workers observed in the same establishment between 1988.Q2
and 1994.Q1 who separate from that employer by Q1 of each subsequent year. The sample is split into REBP (red,
short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid) regions. The yellow dashed line plots the predicted Coasean separation rate
using Equation (13). The retirement age for Austrian men was 60 years old in this period, which explains the spike in
separations among older cohorts.
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Figure 5: Difference, REBP vs. Non-REBP Region: Separation Rate of “REBP Survivors” from 1994
Onward
(a) Through 1995
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
Jul33 Jul38 Jul43 Jul48
Date of Birth
Difference in Separations after Q1-94, REBP vs. Non-REBP
Predicted Difference in Separations after Q1-94
(b) Through 1996
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(c) Through 1997
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(d) Through 1998
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Note: The figure shows, by month of birth, the difference in separation rates from Figure 4 between the REBP and
non-REBP regions (red, solid). The yellow dashed line plots the predicted Coasean separation rate using Equation (13).
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Figure 6: Difference by Industry Growth, REBP vs. Non-REBP Region: Separation Rate of “REBP
Survivors” from 1994 Onward
(a) Through 1995
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(b) Through 1996
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(c) Through 1997
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(d) Through 1998
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Note: These figures split the by-cohort regional difference from Figure 5 into terciles of industry growth, with the
first tercile denoting the lowest and the third tercile denoting the highest industry growth. Specifically, we calculate
employment growth between February 1994 and the given year for each industry, among all workers (not just stayers)
born 1938 or later to avoid those who are retiring. We then assign REBP stayers to the industries of their REBP-period
establishments. We calculate growth rates for industries at the two-digit NACE level.
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Figure 7: Establishment-Level “Hockey-Sticks”
(a) Separations vs. Annual Establishment
Growth, 1994-1998
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(b) Survivor Separations by Cohort and Region
(1994 to 1996)
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(c) Birth Cohort-Specific Slopes
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Note: These figures plot the results of an analysis focusing on labor demand shifts within establishments. In an attempt
to confirm the “hockey-stick” relationship between separations and employment growth at the establishment level (Davis
et al., 2013) in the Austrian setting, Panel (a) plots annual separation rates for all workers employed in a given year by
bins of annual establishment employment growth rates (first quarter of every year), pooling years 1994 through 1998.
Panel (b) focuses on separations among the four relevant groups tracked throughout the paper: REBP-eligible and -
ineligible birth cohorts and regions, while still plotting against total establishment employment growth. We ignore the
cohorts born before 1936 since they have reached retirement age in 1996. Panel (c) plots the slope of the cohort-specific
relationship between separations and establishment growth (1994-1996) among shrinking establishments for each year of
birth and split between the REBP and non-REBP regions. We adjust throughout for spurious layoffs due to mergers,
take-overs, and administrative changes to the ASSD using the procedure outlined in Fink et al. (2010).
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Figure 8: Conceptual Framework: Separations and Shocks
(a) Case Studies of Jobs
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Note: The figures plot the dynamics of job separations in the model, in the Coasean (efficient bargaining) and non-Coasean
(fixed-wage) settings. Panel (a) plots job case studies in the two-dimensional space of worker and firm components of
joint job surplus, and net of wage surpluses. Panels (a) and (b) plot the relationship between separations in the former
treatment group (FT ) and former control group (FC) in response to firm (a) and worker (b) side surplus shocks, after
REBP, for the Coasean and non-Coasean settings. Panel (d) plots the relationship between treatment group and control
group separation rates, after REBP, for the Coasean and non-Coasean setting. Section 5 describes the model and the
exercises in detail.
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Figure 9: Conceptual Framework: Distribution of Job Surplus and Separations
(a.C) Coasean, UI benefit increase
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(b.C) Coasean, Post-REBP, Treated
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(b.NC) Non-Coasean, Post-REBP,
Treated
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(c.C) Coasean, Post-REBP, Control
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Note: The figure illustrates the model dynamics of job separations, described in Section 5, in the Coasean
(efficient bargaining, left panels) and non-Coasean (fixed-wage, right panels) settings. The figures plot
contour maps of the density of the joint distribution of firm (y-axis) and worker (x-axis) surpluses; darker
shades indicate higher densities, drawn from a bivariate normal distribution. The [non-]Coasean surplus
notions are gross[net]-of-wage fundamentals. Panels (a.C) and (a.NC) plot the selection of jobs surviving
REBP in the treatment [control] group in the left [right] contour map within each panel a.C and a.NC.
Panels (b.C) and (b.NC) [(c.C) and (c.NC)] plot post-REBP sensitivity of separations separately among
the former treatment [control] group to post-REBP shocks to worker and firm surplus.
58
Figure 10: Separation Rates in Formerly Treated and Younger Control Cohorts (REBP Region)
(a) Separations by 1995
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(b) Separations by 1996
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(c) Separations by 1997
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(d) Separations by 1998
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Note: The figures plot binned scatter plots of the separation rates at the industry-by-occupation cell level in formerly
treated cohorts (born between 1938 and 1943) against separations rates in slightly younger cohorts (born between 1943
and 1948). As a benchmark, we also plot as outcome variable the separation rate in even younger cohorts (born between
1948 and 1953). Observations are weighted by the number of REBP survivors. Industries are categorized at the four-digit
level.
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Figure 11: Effect of REBP on Quits and Mutual Separations between Age 50 and 54
(a) Microcensus: Effect on Separation Types
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(b) Microcensus: Effect on Types of Quits
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(c) ASSD: Effect on Quits
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Note: The figures plot data on quits from two sources. Panels (a) and (b) plots outcomes based on the Austrian
Microcensus and show treatment effects for the REBP program in a difference-in-difference specification controlling for
region and cohort fixed effects on types of separation (a) and, more specifically, types of quits (b). The seven outcome
variables that we consider in (a) are indicators that equal one if a respondent’s last employment spell ended between
the ages of 50 and 54 and was either a one-sided or amicable quit, a layoff due to establishment closure, a layoff due to
economic reasons, a layoff for other reasons, early retirement, regular retirement, or for other reasons. The three outcome
variables that we consider in (b) are indicators that equal one if a respondent’s last employment spell ended between the
ages of 50 and 54 and was a quit and was either (i) due to personal or family circumstances, (ii) sickness or disability,
or (iii) other reasons. Each estimate stems from a separate regression based on 180,137 observations. As a baseline for
(a), the values in the control region (among workers from REBP-eligible cohorts) are Quit (amicable or not): 0.00697;
Layoff (closure): 0.00346; Layoff (economic reason): 0.0036; Layoff (other): 0.00275; Early Retirement: 0.0350; Regular
Retirement: 0.0126; Other: 0.0383. For (b), control region values are Personal or family circumstances: 0.00182; Sickness
or disability: 0.00389; Other reasons: 0.00126. The red vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals based on standard
errors clustered at the administrative region level. Using the Austrian Social Security Dataset, panels (c) and (d) plots
an indicator for those who do not take up UI until at least 28 days (the waiting period for quitters to receive UI) after
the end of any of their employment spells between the ages of 50 and 55. Note that there could be quitters who decide
never to receive UI (see Section 6.1) or who find re-employment before the end of the 28-day window.
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Figure 12: Complier Characteristics and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
(a) Visualizing the Approach
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Note: Panel (a) outlines how we create the groups of Always-Separators, Compliers, and Never-Separators using the
procedure outlined in Section 6.2.1. It first shows the separation rate among employed workers in 1988.Q2 by 1993.Q3,
when REBP was abolished, by region and cohort eligibility. It then shows how the share of Always-Separators is made up
of the separations among the ineligible age cohorts in the REBP region adjusted for the difference between age cohorts
using values from the control region. Any separations in excess of this value are the REBP compliers. Then the share of
never-separators are the stayers in the REBP region among the eligible cohort. Panel (b) shows the difference between
the averages for compliers and always-separators (C-A) as well as for compliers and never-separators (C-N) that are
reported in Table 6. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors from 1,000 bootstrap replications blocked at the
administrative region level. See Sections 6 and D for more details on how the variables are constructed. See Section
6.2.1 for the methodology underlying the decomposition into the groups of compliers, never-separators, and always-
separators. Panel (b) shows the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of REBP across different characteristics. For binary
characteristics (e.g., Blue Collar), we report the treatment effect for each group (1 in red circles, 0 in blue squares).
For continuous variables (e.g., earnings), we report the treatment effect on the sample above and below the median (red
circles and blue squares respectively). The estimated treatment effect on the full sample is reported at the top with a
maroon triangle and the vertical dashed line.
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Online Appendix of:
Marginal Jobs and Job Surplus:
A Test of the Efficiency of Separations
Simon Ja¨ger, Benjamin Schoefer, and Josef Zweimu¨ller
A Quantifying Worker’s Value of the REBP UI Extension
We calculate the cash value of extended benefits following the approach in Card et al. (2007) and
complement it with new data on unemployment assistance (UA, “Notstandshilfe” in German). Our
estimate for the average cash value of the reform corresponds to about eight to nine months of pay or
71% of a worker’s annual salary.
The REBP changed potential UI benefit duration from 30 or 52 weeks to 209 weeks for older
workers (see Figure 1a).57 To provide a conservative estimate of the value of the reform, we take 52
weeks as the alternative potential benefit duration. Under this assumption, REBP changed benefits
by 157 weeks or 36.1315 months.
When benefits run out, many workers are eligible for lower UA benefits. UA benefits are means-
tested and depend on other sources of income as well as the number of dependents. They are capped
at 0.92 of the workers UI benefits, according to the formula
UA = min(0.92×UI,max(0, 0.95 · UI Spousal Earnings + Dependent Allowances)). (A1)
To impute counterfactual UA payments, we draw on data from the AMS, the Austrian employment
agency, on unemployment benefit and UA receipt. This allows us to observe actually paid out UI and
UA benefits. We draw on data from a period when both UI and UA payments are observed in the
AMS data (2001-2009), and zoom in on workers whose UI benefits ran out and who did not take up
employment in the subsequent 60 days. We then calculate the average ratio of UA to UI benefits. We
assign everyone zero UA benefits if they do not receive UA benefits in the 60 days after UI benefits
ran out, even though they may have been eligible for non-zero UA benefits but did not take them up.
In our sample, we find that the average UA benefit corresponds to 50.5% of previous UI benefits.
The average replacement rate between 1988 and 1993 was 40.0%. We calculate that the average
replacement rate for worker in eligible cohorts in the REBP region by simply assigning replacement
rates to workers based on their earnings and averaging over workers from 1988 to 1993.
As a final input into our calculation, we account for the fact that benefits are not taxed. The
average tax rate for personal income in Austria was 11.2% after a 1989 tax reform (OECD, 1990). In
addition, employee-borne payroll taxes of about 18% were levied on wages.58 We thus scale up UI and
UA benefits relative to gross income by 1/((1− τaverage)(1− τSoc. Sec.average )) to account for non-taxation of
benefits.
We can then calculate the cash value of the reform to the average worker according to the formula:
31.1315︸ ︷︷ ︸
Additional UI months
× 0.400︸ ︷︷ ︸
UI RR
× (1− 0.505)︸ ︷︷ ︸
( UI RR - UA RR
UI RR
)
× ((1− 0.115)(1− 0.18))−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
((1−τaverage)(1−τSoc. Sec.average ))−1
×w ' 8.494 · w, (A2)
57For most of the treatment period, since 1989, the potential benefit duration for older workers was 52 weeks. Until
1989, the potential benefit duration was 30 weeks.
58Specifically, the total payroll taxes contribution rates for workers and firms were, in sum, 34.5% for blue- and 38.6%
for white-collar workers (OECD, 1990). In our sample, about 35.4% of workers among 1988 job holders were white-collar
workers so that the average social security contribution rate is 0.345 · (1−0.354)+0.386 ·0.354 ' 0.36, leading to a worker
contribution rate of 18%.
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where w denotes the average worker’s monthly gross wage and RR denotes replacement rates. Accord-
ing to this calculation, the average cash value of the REBP reform to workers was about eight to nine
months of salary or 71% of an annual salary.59
59Wages in Austria are paid based in 14, rather than 12, installments. The additional two installments are incorporated
in the calculation of UI benefits. The monthly wage we mention above corresponds to an average wage corresponding to
the annual salary divided by 12.
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B Validation of Micro Census: Replicating the Treatment Effect of
REBP on Separations
We validate whether the REBP led to excess separations in our micro census sample. Figure A.1
plots an indicator for whether the last employment spell of a non-employed respondent ended when
the respondent was between 50 and 54 years old, i.e. the effective age range when extended benefits
were available under the REBP program. The Figure shows averages of the indicator by cohort and
region. As in the analysis based on administrative data, the analysis based on the Microcensus survey
data clearly documents excess separations in the REBP regions for cohorts affected by the reform, i.e.
those born between 1933 and 1943. The lines of the REBP and the control regions are parallel and in
fact almost lie on top of one another outside of the treatment cohorts.
Figure A.1: Microcensus: Effect of REBP on Separations between Age 50 and 54
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Note: The figure plots data based on the Austrian Microcensus. Across cohorts and regions, it plots an indicator variable
for whether a respondent’s last employment spell ended in the time when a respondent was between 50 and 54 years old.
The two red vertical lines denote the oldest and youngest cohorts, respectively, who were eligible for the REBP program
between 1988 and 1993 and were aged between 50 and 54 at some point in that time range.
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C Complier Characteristics in Difference-in-Differences IV Settings
C.1 Methodology
Here, we provide the detailed, stand-alone methodological guide deriving and formalizing complier
analysis in difference-in-differences contexts. To our knowledge, ours is the first characterization of
sufficient conditions for complier analysis in difference-in-differences contexts. We complement re-
cent advances to extend instrumental variable approaches to the difference-in-differences framework
(De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (ming), Hudson et al. (2017)).
Setting and notation. We develop the methodology in the context of a two-dimensional group
setup: cohorts c ∈ {c0, c1} and regions r ∈ {r0, r1}. In other contexts, cohorts may describe time (pre-
and post-reform, for example), and regions may define treatment and control groups. Importantly, the
data set contains observations that span the group space: (r1, c1), (r1, c0), (r0, c1) and (r0, c0). In the
expressions below, let (r1, c1) represent a region and cohort combination such that Z = 1 (the treated
groups). For all other groups, Z = 0 (control groups), i.e. for other region and cohort combinations
(i.e. Z = 0 for(r0, c1), (r1, c0) or (r0, c0)).
Assumptions. We show how complier characteristics are identified in difference-in-differences set-
tings under the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. First stage: For all r ∈ {r0, r1} and c ∈ {c0, c1}, P (D1 = 1|r, c) >
P (D0 = 1|r, c).
Intuitively, Assumption 1 posits that more separations take place under the reform and ensures the
existence of compliers.
Assumption 2. Monotonicity: D1 −D0 ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 rules out defiers, i.e. individuals that would separate if benefits are not extended but
would not separate if unemployment benefits are more generous.
Assumption 3. Independence: (x,D0, D1) ⊥ Z|(r, c).
The independence assumption posits that conditional on r and c, the instrument Z is orthogonal to x,
D0, and D1.
Assumption 4. Additive separability: (a) For all c ∈ {c0, c1} and d, d′ ∈ {0, 1},
E[x|c, r,D0 = d,D1 = d′]−E[x|c′, r,D0 = d,D1 = d′] does not depend on r.
(b) For all c ∈ {c0, c1} and d, d′ ∈ {0, 1},
P (D0 = d,D1 = d
′|c, r)-P (D0 = d,D1 = d′|c′, r) does not depend on r.
Instrument. Since Z does not vary conditional on region and age, we only observe either Z = 0,
or Z = 1, for a given region and cohort cell. Under the first stage and monotonicity assumption, the
expected value of complier characteristics can be represented as a function of observable quantities for
all region/cohort combinations.
We can rewrite the conditional expectation of individuals with D1 = 1 in region r and from cohort
c as follows:
E[x|D1 = 1, r, c] = E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 1] · P (D0 = 1|r, c,D1 = 1)
+E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 0] · P (D0 = 0|r, c,D1 = 1). (A3)
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Rearranging yields
E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 0] = 1P (D0=0|r,c,D1=1) ·E[x|r, c,D1 = 1]
−P (D0=1|r,c,D1=1)P (D0=0|r,c,D1=1)E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 1].
(A4)
By monotonicity (D1 − D0 ≥ 0), we have that E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 1] = E[x|r, c,D0 = 1], which
implies:
E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 0] = 1P (D0=0|r,c,D1=1) ·E[x|r, c,D1 = 1]
−P (D0=1|r,c,D1=1)P (D0=0|r,c,D1=1)E[x|r, c,D0 = 1].
(A5)
Using the definition of conditional probabilities, P (D0 = 1|r, c,D1 = 1) = P (D0=1,D1=1|r,c)P (D=1|r,c) and P (D0 =
0|r, c,D1 = 1) = P (D=0,D1=1|r,c)P (D1=1|r,c) . Define the (conditional on region and cohort) probability of always-
separators as piArc = P (D0 = 1, D1 = 1|r, c), of never-separators as piNrc = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 0|r, c) and by
monotonicity of compliers as piCrc = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 1|r, c) = 1−piArc−piNrc. The conditional expectation
term above can then be expressed as follows:
E[x|r, c,D1 = 1, D0 = 0] = pi
C
rc+pi
A
rc
piCrc
·E[x|r, c,D1 = 1]
−piArc
piCrc
E[x|r, c,D0 = 1].
(A6)
Equation A6 shows that complier characteristics are identified in a difference-in-difference IV setting.
We can construct sample analogues to each of the terms on the right-hand side as follows by drawing
on the independence and additive separability assumption. The following exposition follows the case
of calculating characteristics conditional on (r, c) = (r1, c1). By independence, we have that:
E[x|r1, c1, D1 = 1] = E[x|r1, c1, D = 1, Z = 1]. (A7)
By independence and additive separability in x, we have:
E[x|r1, c1, D0 = 1] = E[x|r1, c0, D0 = 1] + (E[x|r0, c1, D0 = 1]−E[x|r0, c0, D0 = 1])
= E[x|r1, c0, D = 1, Z = 0] (A8)
+E[x|r0, c1, D = 1, Z = 0]
−E[x|r0, c0, D = 1, Z = 0]. (A9)
Sample analogues exist for each of the right-hand side terms in A7 and A8:
E[x|r1, c1, D = 1, Z = 1] = 1
Nr1,c1
∑
i∈(r1,c1)
xiDi, (A10)
E[x|r, c0, D = 1, Z = 0] = 1
Nr1,c0
∑
i∈(r1,c0)
xiDi, (A11)
E[x|r0, c1, D = 1, Z = 0] = 1
Nr0,c1
∑
i∈(r0,c1)
xiDi, (A12)
E[x|r0, c0, D = 1, Z = 0] = 1
Nr0,c0
∑
i∈(r0,c0)
xiDi, (A13)
where Nr1,c1 is the number of observations in (r1, c1) and so forth.
For the conditional probabilities in A6 note that (using independence and the additive separability
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in D assumption):
piArc = P (D0 = 1, D1 = 1|r1, c1) = P (D0 = 1|r1, c1)
= P (D0 = 1|r1, c0) + P (D0 = 1|r0, c1)− P (D0 = 1|r0, c0) (A14)
= E(D|Z = 0, r1, c0) + E(D|Z = 0, r0, c1)− E(D|Z = 0, r0, c0)
piNrc = P (D0 = 0, D1 = 0|r1, c1) = P (D1 = 0|r1, c1)
= P (D = 0|Z = 1, r1, c1) (A15)
= 1− E(D|Z = 1, r1, c1).
These quantities can be estimated in the regression:
Dirc = β + φr + ψc + νZrc + χirc. (A16)
The sample estimators are then given by piArc = βˆ + φˆr + ψˆc , pi
N
rc = 1 − βˆ − φˆr − ψˆc − νˆ and piCrc =
1− piNrc − piArc = νˆ. All objects on the right-hand side of A6 thus have estimable sample counterparts.
Extensions. Under additional assumptions, we can alternatively estimate the conditional expecta-
tions in A6 in a regression framework. Specifically, if trends in x are the same for always-separators,
always-separators and compliers, never-separators, and never-separators and compliers, the conditional
expectations of characteristics can be estimated from the regression below:
xirc = α+ κr + λc + ωDirc + γZrc + ϕDirc × Zrc + irc. (A17)
This regression implies common trends across the four identified groups since the values of D and Z
do not affect the trends κ, λ. The sample estimators are E[x|r, c,D1 = 1] = αˆ + κˆr + λˆc + ωˆ + γˆ + ϕˆ,
and E[x|r, c,D0 = 1] = αˆ+ κˆr + λˆc + ωˆ.
Under slightly weaker assumptions, not requiring us to assume parallel trends for never-separators
and compliers, we can use the following regression to estimate the required conditional expectations in
equation 30 by interacting the trend variables with D so that we can estimate separate trends for (1)
always-separators and (2) never-separators and compliers:
xirc = α+ κr + λc + ωDirc + κ˜r ×Dirc + λ˜c ×Dirc + γZrc + ϕDirc × Zrc + irc (A18)
We then have E[x|r, c,D0 = 1] = α+ κr + λc + ω + κ˜r + λ˜c and E[x|r, c,D1 = 1] = α+ κr + λc + ω +
κ˜r + λ˜c + γ + ϕ. Our approach can also be extended to estimate complier characteristics in the Z = 0
cells if one of the following assumptions holds:
Assumption 5 (a). Age and region trends are the same for always-separators and
compliers, or
Assumption 5 (b). Age and region trends are the same for always-separators and
never-separators and either the proportion of compliers or never-separators is constant
across age and region.
C.2 Estimation Procedure for Complier Characteristics
We describe the non-parametric bootstrapping procedure for inference on the methodology described
in Section 6.2.1.
We use bootstrap samples of all employed men in 1988.Q2 working in either the non-REBP region
or the region where REBP was abolished in 1993. As in the DiD specifications (Tables 2 through
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3), we take samples by random clusters of administrative region.60 Specifically, we take blocks of the
NUTS 3 designations for Austria, which consist of groups of districts (Bezirke) within the Austrian
states (Bundesla¨nder).
For each of the 1,000 random samplings of administrative regions, we
1. Estimate the proportion of always-separators, never-separators, and compliers using Equations
27, 28, and 29, respectively.
2. Estimate the average of each outcome among compliers, always-separators, and never-separators
by calculating the relevant conditional means and using Equation 32. Namely, we use the sample
analogues in Equation 33. We also take differences between the complier average and the other
two averages.
3. Estimate regional and cohort averages to investigate parallel trends (see Table A.1). Specifically,
for each outcome Yi, we run the DiD specification
Yi = β + φr + ψc + νZrc + χirc (A19)
where every individual i is in region r (REBP vs. non-REBP) and cohort c (REBP-eligible vs.
ineligible). Then,
• For column (1) in Table A.1, the difference between the eligible and ineligible cohorts in the
non-REBP region is ψˆc.
• For column (2) in Table A.1, the cohort difference in the REBP region is ψˆc + νˆ.
• For column (3) in Table A.1, the difference-in-differences is νˆ.
4. Investigate treatment effect heterogeneity.
• Specifically, we create indicators for whether the individual is above or below the median
value of each characteristic for continuous variables like earnings and an indicator for each
value for binary characteristics like being in a blue-collar occupation.
• We run the DiD specification in Equation 1 separately for each group.61
• We keep the two estimates of νˆ and also take differences for the final column of Table 6.
The final output is 1,000 estimates of each value of interest, one from each random sample of districts.
The reported standard errors are the standard deviation of these 1,000 estimates. The reported point
estimates are the same specifications run on the full sample.
60In practice, we use the bsample command in Stata with the cluster option.
61Equivalently, we fully interact the DiD specification with the indicator.
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D Variable Construction
We describe the construction of each outcome variable presented in the paper. In the descriptions
below, status refers to a variable in the ASSD aggregating hundreds of administrative designations
into 12 labor market statuses (Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009).
1. Separation
• Create an indicator if, between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), the worker is observed
in the same establishment.
• If not, the worker is separated
2. Separation into Nonemployment
• Create an indicator if, between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), the worker is observed
as employed (status = 3) in the current period and not employed (status 6= 3).
3. Separation into New Job
• Create an indicator if, between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q2), the worker is observed
as employed (status = 3) in the current period and in the next but observed in different
establishments.
4. Unemployment (Months)
• Between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), count the number of quarters where the
worker is observed on UI (status = 1).
• Multiply the quarter count by 3 to get a monthly count for tractability.
5. Continuous Employment (Months)
• Between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), count the number of quarters where the
worker is employed in the same establishment as the quarter before.
• Stop counting when the worker is observed either employed in a new establishment or with
another labor market status.
6. Quit (Indicator)
• Out of the original labor market spell data from the ASSD, count the number of days between
the end of an employment spell (status = 3) and the beginning of an unemployment spell
(status = 1).
• For the yearly analysis, isolate employment spells that end during the REBP period (1988q2
through 1993q3).
• For the age analysis, isolate employment spells that end while the worker is between 50 and
55 years old.
• If the beginning of the unemployment spell occurs 28 days or more after the end of any
employment spell during this range, the worker is considered to have quit.
7. Local Unemployment Rate
• Take the snapshot of men in the ASSD from 1988q2 (May 15, 1988).
• Assign each worker a municipality (Gemeinde) by the location of the establishment at which
they work.
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• Count the number on UI (status = 1) in each municipality.
• Count the number of workers not on any pension, i.e. neither on disability (e.g., Beruf-
sunfa¨higkeitspension) nor retirement pensions.
8. Local Unemp. Rate (50+)
• Do the same as for unemployment rates, but restrict to the sample of workers who are 50
years old or older in 1988q2.
9. Establishment Size
• For every establishment, count the total number of men of any age employed in 1988q2.
10. Employment Growth at Establishment
• In Table 1 and the complier analysis, this counts the percent difference between the number
of men (no age restriction) employed in the establishment in 1983q2 and 1988q2.
• In Figure 7, this is the percent difference between the number of men born in 1933 or
later (to avoid retirements) and employed in each establishment in 1994q1 and Q1 of each
following year.
11. 1(Growing Establishment)
• In all cases, this is an indicator for whether the establishment employment growth variable
calculated above is positive.
12. Employment Growth at Industry
• This counts the percent difference between the number of men (no age restriction) employed
in one of 15 industries in 1983q2 and 1988q2.
13. Establishment Fixed Effects
• Begin with the sample of all workers in May 1977 through 1987.
• The earnings value is the total annual earnings in 2002 EUR from the establishment at
which the worker is employed on June 15 of each year.
• Winsorize the earnings value to the 5th and 95th percentile by year and take the logarithm.
• Regress log earnings on a third-degree polynomial of age and fixed effects for each worker
and establishment using the procedure to estimate high-dimensional fixed effects outlined
in Correia et al. (2016).
• Assign to each worker the establishment fixed effect from the establishment at which they
work in 1988q2.
14. Worker Fixed Effects
• Use the worker fixed effects estimated in the proecedure outlined to estimate establishment
fixed effects.
15. Share on Sick Leave/Disability in Industry
• Begin with the sample of men age 50 to 55 in any quarter of years 1977 through 1988.
• If workers are non-employed in a given quarter, assign the establishment identifier of their
last employe, i.e. the establishment identifier of the last establishment where status = 3.
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• These assigned establishments are used to assign industry.
• By four-digit NACE industry level, calculate the share of workers on sick leave (status = 2)
and receiving disability payments (status = 5) as a fraction of all workers assigned to that
industry across all periods.
16. Long Spell Duration Risk
• Begin with the sample of all men and quarters from 1982 through 1987.
• Count the length of each spell on UI (status = 1) by quarter.
• Isolate the maximum length of a UI spell for each worker.
• Create an indicator for whether the maximum length of the UI spell for each worker is
greater than 1 year (4 quarters).
• Regress this indicator on fixed effects for 15 large industries, an indicator for being in a white-
collar occupation, the local unemployment rate (see above), and third-degree polynomials
of tenure in current job and experience over the last 25 years.
• Predict the outcome, i.e. risk of long UI duration, for every worker in the REBP sample
using these estimates.
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E Additional Figures
Figure A.2: Benefit Extensions and Employment Outcomes by Age
(a) Quarters Employed (Age 50 to 55) (a) Difference (REBP - Control)
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Quarters Employed Ages 50-55, Control Group
Quarters Employed Ages 50-55, Treatment Group
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Jul28 Jul33 Jul38 Jul43 Jul48
Date of Birth
(b) Quarters Unemployed (Age 50 to 55) (b) Difference (REBP - Control)
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Quarters Unemployed Ages 50-55, Treatment Group
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2
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Note: Panels (a) and (c) show the average number of quarters that the workers are employed and on UI, respectively,
until the quarter before they turn 55, among those employed in the quarter before they turn 50. Both plot rates by
month of birth and within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid) regions. Panels (b) and (d) show
the difference between the REBP and the control region by cohort. Cohorts born after 1943 were not covered by the
policy as they turned 50 after the program was abolished 1993.
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Figure A.3: REBP Effects by Age
Age 51 Age 51 (Difference)
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Note: This figure shows the separation rate from jobs held in the quarter before workers turn 50 through the quarter
before their birthday. See Figures 2(c) and (d) for the full effect of the REBP from ages 50 through 54. The horizontal
dashed line shows the oldest cohort that had been exposed to the REBP at a given age. For example, at age 51, only
those born between 1937 and 1943 had been exposed to the REBP because older cohorts turned 51 before the REBP
began, i.e. before 1988. Younger cohorts, meanwhile, turned 50 after the REBP was abolished and thus were never
eligible. Cohorts 1938-1943 turned 50 during the REBP. The thin, solid horizontal lines bookend the treated cohorts that
were the focus of our analysis, i.e. cohorts that were ever eligible for REBP benefits but had not reached the retirement
age by the program’s abolition in 1993.
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Figure A.4: “Phantom” Treatment Effects
-.
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Year of Birth
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 1st Quintile (Lowest Growth)
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 2nd Quintile
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 3rd Quintile
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 4th Quintile
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 5th Quintile (Highest Growth)
Note: This figure gives a sense of possible post-abolition separation effects by REBP. It plots, by year of birth, the
separations from 1993q3, the first quarter after the abolition of the REBP, to 1994q1, among the workers who remain
employed in their 1988q2 establishment in 1993q3, i.e. the REBP “survivors.” It breaks the separations into quintiles
of industry growth rates (not worker-weighted) to emphasize where the additional separations occur. This, along with
grandfathering clauses in the law abolishing the REBP (see Section 2), motivates our decision to analyze possible resilience
effects by looking at jobs that survived through 1994q1, rather than those surviving only to the abolition of the reform.
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F Additional Tables
Table A.1: Complier Characteristics: Balance Check
Cohort Difference, REBP vs. Non-REBP
Non-REBP Region REBP Region Difference
Blue Collar 0.0180 0.0260 0.00800
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Emp. Growth Industry -0.00500 -0.00700 -0.00200
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Emp. Growth at Establishment -0.0300 -0.0530 -0.0230
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
1(Growing Establishment) -0.0220 -0.0500 -0.0280
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Earnings 233.7 300.8 67.06
(51.122) (101.396) (109.150)
Establishment FE 0.0140 0.0110 -0.00300
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Worker FE -0.0310 -0.0330 -0.00200
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Tenure 1.276 1.497 0.221
(0.081) (0.091) (0.105)
Share on Sick Leave in Industry × 100 -0.00200 0.00700 0.00900
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Share on Disability in Industry × 100 0.0680 0.172 0.104
(0.029) (0.038) (0.049)
Share on Sick Leave/Disability in Industry × 100 0.0660 0.179 0.113
(0.031) (0.039) (0.051)
Long Spell Duration Risk 0.0220 0.0240 0.00300
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Establishment Size: 5 or Less -0.0110 -0.00900 0.00200
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Establishment Size: 6 and 20 -0.00700 -0.0100 -0.00400
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Establishment Size: 21 and 100 -0.00500 0 0.00500
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Establishment Size: 101 and 200 0.00400 0 -0.00400
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Establishment Size: 201 or Greater 0.0180 0.0190 0.00100
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Note: This table reports the mean difference for the characteristics reported in the left column between
REBP-eligible and -ineligible cohorts in the non-REBP Region (column 1) vs. the REBP Region
(column 2). Column (3) reports the difference between column (2) and (1). For an overview of the
methodology see Section 6. For each of the variables and groups, the table reports means as well as
standard errors (in parentheses) based on 1,000 bootstrap replications blocked at the administrative
region level. Given the small percentage-point differences, the industry share variables are multiplied
by 100 in order to be legible. See Section 6 and Appendix D for more details on how the variables are
constructed. See Section 6.2.1 for the methodology underlying the decomposition into the groups.
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